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INTRODUCTION
Model Rule 5.5 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct1 addresses two interrelated issues: the unauthorized
1. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Model
Rule 5.5, Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law,
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in
doing so.
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office
or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the
practice of law; or
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is
admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not
disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide
legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  10 4/26/21  8:53 AM






    









































682 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
practice of law, which applies to lawyers and nonlawyers alike, and
multijurisdictional practice, which applies to lawyers who are licensed to
practice in one state but whose work may involve or take them to states
where they are not licensed. 
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding
before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person
the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such
proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration,
mediation, or other alternative resolution proceeding in this or another
jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to
practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission; or
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is admitted to practice.
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreign
jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any
jurisdiction or the equivalent thereof, or a person otherwise lawfully
practicing as an in-house counsel under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction,
may provide legal services through an office or other systematic and
continuous presence in this jurisdiction that:
(1) are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational
affiliates, are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission; and when performed by a foreign lawyer and requires
advice on the law of this or another U.S. jurisdiction or of the United
States, such advice shall be based upon the advice of a lawyer who is
duly licensed and authorized by the jurisdiction to provide such advice;
or
(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or
rule to provide in this jurisdiction.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (d):
(1) the foreign lawyer must be a member in good standing of a
recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of
which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the
equivalent, and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly
constituted professional body or a public authority; or
(2) the person otherwise lawfully practicing as an in-house counsel 
under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction must be authorized to practice
under this Rule by, in the exercise of its discretion, [the highest court
of this jurisdiction].
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Unlike litigators, who can file motions for pro hac vice admission in
courts in states in which they are not licensed to practice,2 no easy solution 
is available either to transactional lawyers3 or to any attorney who would
like to telecommute.4 Because of its restrictions and limitations, Model
Rule 5.5 is more often honored in the breach than in the observance by
transactional lawyers and telecommuters, and scholars have noted that
“[s]ince the first imposition of restrictions limiting lawyers’ ability to
2. Some states prevent unlimited pro hac admissions. See, for example, MISS.
R. APP. P. 46, requiring the association of a Mississippi attorney in any case where
an out-of-state lawyer seeks to appear, and prohibiting out-of-state attorneys to
“argue orally, or file briefs or any paper in any cause” if they have made appearances
in “more than five (5) separate unrelated causes or other matters before the courts
or administrative agencies of this state within the twelve (12) months immediately 
preceding the appearance in question.” The ABA has conducted a state-by-state
analysis of pro hac rules, updated through January 26, 2017. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, COMPARISON OF ABA
MODEL RULE FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION WITH STATE VERSIONS AND 
AMENDMENT SINCE AUGUST 2002 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/prohac_admin_comp. 
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5N3-BUNG]. This analysis shows that three
states (Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Mexico) and the District of Columbia have
a cap of five appearances in any calendar year, three (Ohio, Arizona, and Florida)
cap it a three appearances within a year, one (Rhode Island) at three appearances in
a five-year period, one (Iowa) at five appearances in 24 months, one (Nevada) at
five appearances during a three-year period, and one (Virginia) at 12 appearances
in 12 months, while Montana’s rule sets the limit at a total of two appearances
without regard to any time frame. Id.
3. This Article uses the term “transactional lawyer” to refer to attorneys
handling matters that do not involve appearing in court and that are not in
preparation for existing or future litigation in which the lawyer may seek to
appear. This phrase does not refer to work involving a pending or potential
arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding. Thus,
the use of this term excludes those whose activities are covered by Model Rule 
5.5(c)(2) and (c)(3). MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(c)(2)–(3) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2019).
4. This Article uses the word “telecommute” to mean a lawyer who works
electronically while physically in a jurisdiction in which the attorney is not 
licensed to practice, even though the work on the attorney’s computer, laptop, or
cell phone creates a “virtual desk” identical to the one the attorney would see if
sitting in the attorney’s office in the lawyer’s “home” jurisdiction, where the
lawyer is licensed.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  12 4/26/21  8:53 AM










    
 
 








     
       
 






   
 




       
       
  
 
684 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
practice law beyond the boundaries of a state in which they were admitted 
to the bar, commentators have been issuing calls for reform.”5 
In addition, after the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020,
many law firms found that state or local restrictions and health concerns
required all or a significant portion of their attorneys to work remotely.
Telecommuting ceased being a matter of convenience and became a matter
of necessity. For law firms that needed lawyers to work during the
pandemic, the locale in which a lawyer sat while telecommuting may have
been irrelevant as long as the lawyer was able to access the firm’s virtual
private network or computer system and perform the tasks necessary. For
each individual lawyer, however, the constraints of each state’s version of
Model Rule 5.5 in the jurisdiction from which the lawyer worked were not
altered, with very few exceptions.6 
This Article focuses on how Model Rule 5.5 impacts transactional
lawyers and telecommuters, discusses how the rationale for Model Rule
5.5 has been undermined by the multi-state bar exam, and offers several
alternatives to the current rule. 
5. Carol A. Needham, Negotiating Multi-State Transactions: Reflections on
Prohibiting the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113
(1993).
6. See infra Part VII.D. See infra text accompanying notes 165–69 for a
discussion of opinions in Utah and Florida allowing lawyers to telecommute. In
addition, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law issued Opinion 24-20: Teleworking from Home and the COVID-
19 Pandemic on March 23, 2020, stating that a lawyer not licensed in the District
of Columbia may practice from a personal residence in the District: 
Under the ‘incidental and temporary practice’ exception of Rule 
49(c)(13) if the attorney (1) is practicing from home due to the COVID-
19 pandemic; (2) maintains a law office in a jurisdiction where the 
attorney is admitted to practice; (3) avoids using a District of Columbia
address in any business document or otherwise holding out as authorized
to practice law in the District of Columbia, and (4) does not regularly
conduct in-person meetings with clients or third parties in the District of
Columbia.
DIST. OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW, OPINION 24-20: TELEWORKING FROM HOME AND THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC (2020), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/CUPL-
Opinion-24-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHM7-Y7S3].
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6852021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF LAW
Historically, American jurisdictions allowed nonlawyers to engage in
many activities that today would be considered the unauthorized practice
of law.7 Eventually, statutes were enacted and rules were adopted to limit
the ability of those not licensed to practice law in a state from engaging in
the types of services that lawyers provided.8 Initially, these efforts focused
7. See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-
of-State Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1041 (2002).
During most of American history prior to the twentieth century, a great
deal of transactional work—such as the preparation of deeds, mortgages,
bonds, contracts, wills, and similar documents—was performed by
nonlawyers, such as notaries public, justices of the peace, minor
courthouse officers, or simply literate men and women with copies of
ubiquitous form books at hand. [FN 112]
[FN112]: . . . Perennial best sellers during a great part of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries in America were variations on the English
concept of a “conductor generalis”—a formbook that was designed
(almost certainly by one or more lawyer authors, as they invariably
claimed) to be used in most of the everyday drafting situations that had
legal significance. See, e.g., Anonymous, A New Conductor Generalis
(Albany 1803). The long title of the work continues “Being a Summary
of the Law Relative to the Duty and Office of Justices of the Peace,
Sheriffs, Coroners, Constables, Jurymen, Overseers of the Poor, etc., etc.
With . . . a Variety of Practical Forms . . . Which Will Be Found Useful
to Citizens, Lawyers and Magistrates.” Id. The anonymous author is
identified on the title page only as “A Gentleman of the Law.” Id. The 
earliest of such a Conductor Generalis was printed in Philadelphia in
1722. See Alfred L. Brophy, “Ingenium Est Fateri Per Quos
Profeceris:” Francis Daniel Pastorius’ Young Country Clerk’s
Collection and Anglo-American Legal Literature 1682-1716, 3 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 637, 640 n.5 (1996). These were near copies of
works of the same name that were quite popular in England during the
same period. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1097-98 (1994).
8. For a history and evolution of the unauthorized practice of law rules, see
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1981). See also Matthew Longobardi, Unauthorized Practice Of Law and
Meaningful Access to the Courts: Is Law Too Important to Be Left to Lawyers?,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2043 (2014) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 81–82 (1973); Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  14 4/26/21  8:53 AM






    
 
  
   
























   
    
       
    
 
   
      





   
686 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
on preventing nonlawyers from undertaking any activities encompassed
within the phrase “the practice of law,”9 although there is no uniform,
universal accepted definition of that phrase.10 As the Pennsylvania
against ‘Legal Bootleggers’—The Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of
the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 
65, 73–76 (2009)). The concept of “unauthorized practice” has never been applied
to the ability of criminal defendants to represent themselves. As was stated in
Faretta v. California, discussing the history of self-representation in court and the
right to counsel in criminal cases:
In the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of self-
representation was, if anything, more fervent than in England.
The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of self-
reliance and a traditional distrust of [lawyers]. When the Colonies were
first settled, “the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-
General and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices 
of the King’s Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the
King’s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.” This
prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where “distrust of lawyers
became an institution.” Several Colonies prohibited pleading for hire in
the 17th century. The prejudice persisted into the 18th century as “the
lower classes came to identify lawyers with the upper class.” The years
of Revolution and Confederation saw an upsurge of antilawyer
sentiment, a “sudden revival, after the War of the Revolution, of the old
dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class.” In the heat of these sentiments
the Constitution was forged.
This is not to say that the Colonies were slow to recognize the value of
counsel in criminal cases. Colonial judges soon departed from ancient 
English practice and allowed accused felons the aid of counsel for their
defense. At the same time, however, the basic right of self-representation
was never questioned. We have found no instance where a colonial court
required a defendant in a criminal case to accept as his representative an
unwanted lawyer. Indeed, even where counsel was permitted, the general
practice continued to be self-representation.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 826–28 (1975).
9. See Rhode, supra note 8.
10. No universal definition of the “practice of law” exists, and thus there is
no universal, accepted definition of what constitutes the “unauthorized” practice.
See, e.g., State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648 (N.D. 1986) (“[W]hat constitutes
the practice of law does not lend itself to an inclusive definition . . . .”); State Bar
of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8–9 (Ariz. 1961) (“In the
light of the historical development of the lawyer’s functions, it is impossible to
lay down an exhaustive definition of ‘the practice of law’ by attempting to
enumerate every conceivable act performed by lawyers in the normal course of
their work.”); Shane L. Goudey, Too Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: The
Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers, 75 OR. L. REV. 889, 893 
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Supreme Court explained in a 1937 opinion, the purpose of the
unauthorized practice prohibitions “is not to secure to lawyers a monopoly,
however deserved, but, by preventing the intrusion of inexpert and
unlearned persons in the practice of law, to assure to the public adequate
protection in the pursuit of justice, than which society knows no loftier
aim.”11 
(1996) (“The vast array of duties and responsibilities of a lawyer prohibit an
exhaustive definition of the ‘practice of law.’”); Kimberly Ann Clemsen, The 
Unlicensed Practice of Law: Overstepping the Boundary, 1 FLA. COASTAL L. J.
535 (2000) (“A comprehensive definition of what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law is difficult, actually almost impossible.”); David McGowan, Two 
Ironies of UPL Laws, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 225 (2017) (“Definitions of the practice
of law tend to be embarrassing. Some states offer definitions so general they say
little more than that judges or bar officials will know unlicensed practice when
they see it, which was Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity.”). Despite the 
American Bar Association’s efforts to create a model definition of the practice of
law, the best the ABA could do was to come up with a recommendation that every
state adopt a definition that “should include the basic premise that the practice of
law is the application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or
objectives of another person or entity.” See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
MODEL DEFINITION: DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW DRAFT (Sept. 18,
2002), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force
_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_definition/ [https://perma.cc/G
W5Z-EZKS] (“A person is presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any
of the following conduct on behalf of another: (1) Giving advice or counsel to
persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities or to those of others; (2)
Selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents or agreements that affect the 
legal rights of a person; (3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body,
including, but not limited to, preparing or filing documents or conducting
discovery; or (4) Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a 
person.”).
11. Shortz v. Farrell, 193 A. 20, 24–25 (Pa. 1937); see also State v. Pledger, 
127 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1962) (“The [unauthorized practice] statute was not enacted
for the purpose of conferring upon the legal profession an absolute monopoly in
the preparation of legal documents; its purpose is for the better security of the
people against incompetency and dishonesty in an area of activity affecting
general welfare.”); State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 1962) (“The reason
for prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been examined and
found qualified to practice is frequently misunderstood. It is not done to aid or 
protect the members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a 
monopoly or closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by unqualified persons over whom the judicial 
department can exercise little, if any, control in the matter of infractions of the
code of conduct which, in the public interest, lawyers are bound to observe.”).
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688 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Despite the claimed rationale that the public must be protected from
nonlawyers engaging in the “practice of law,” the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that, even though there are actions that might constitute the
practice of law in a particular state, local jurisdictions may not prevent
nonlawyers from functioning in certain capacities overseen by federal 
agencies. In Sperry v. Florida,12 the Court held that Florida could not
enjoin a nonlawyer whom the Patent Office had registered to practice as a 
patent agent from performing activities within the scope of his registration, 
even though the individual’s actions constituted the “practice of law” in
Florida. 
Over time, the rules expanded the concept of “unauthorized practice”
to include lawyers practicing outside the jurisdiction in which they were
licensed. One might ask why competency-by-geography is such a major
concern if lawyers are trained in the law, are educated in legal reasoning
and analysis, and are expected to be competent the fields in which they
practice—is its primary purpose the protection of the public or the
protection of local lawyers?13 
This debate is not new. In 1894, a Pennsylvania lawyer asked the
Pennsylvania court to void a writ obtained by a lawyer who was not
admitted to practice in the county where the writ was granted. The court
refused to do so.14 While the discussion in the case is short, it is apparent
that the underlying issue was not the competency of the lawyer but rather
the attempt of local attorneys to create a geographic barrier to protect their
practices.
12. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 (1963).
13. See Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession’s Approach to
Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 
WIS. L. REV. 639, 650 (1983) (“In 1938, participating in a symposium
condemning ‘the unauthorized practice of law,’ Karl Llewellyn asked a somewhat
embarrassing question: ‘Who is worrying about unauthorized practice, and why?
Is it the public, complaining of quacks? Is it the profession concerned about the
public welfare? Or who and why?’ As Llewellyn and other commentators have
recognized, the lack of paying work in the depression to a large extent explained
the bar’s sensitivity to the problem of unauthorized practice, or competition by
nonlawyers. Neither public demand nor concern about public welfare adequately
justified the sudden emphasis on eliminating the unauthorized practice of law. It
was primarily the profession’s issue—not that of the general public.”).
14. Hooven Mercantile Co. v. Morgan, 4 Pa. D. 48 (Ct. of Common Pleas of
Pa. 1894).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF MODEL RULE 5.5
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, enacted in 1969,
consisted of three parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations (ECs), and
Disciplinary Rules (DRs). The Canons were essentially aspirational
subject headings, the ECs were hortatory statements, and the DRs were
mandatory rules which lawyers were required to follow.15 
Canon 3 was entitled “A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the
Unauthorized Practice of Law.” DR 3-101(B) stated that a “lawyer shall
not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of
regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.” The majority of the ECs
to Canon 3 focused on the differences between lawyers and nonlawyers.
EC 3-1 noted that the “prohibition against the practice of law by a layman
is grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those
who undertake to render legal services.”16 Yet, while acknowledging that
the practice of law is “accomplished principally by the respective states,
and that “the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per se a
grant of the right to practice elsewhere,”17 EC 3-9 gave a nod to what is 
now called “multijurisdictional practice” when it stated that the “demands
of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the
regulation of the practice of law by the states” and contending that, in
“furtherance of the public interest, the legal profession should discourage
regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right
of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client.”18 Despite this
15. See, e.g., John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 265 (1970)
(“In offering the new Code, the ABA committee stressed that many existing
standards of the traditional canons were sound in substance but in need of
restatement. Without restatement, ‘[m]ost of the Canons do not lend themselves
to practical sanctions for violations; . . .’ . . . . Many of [the pre-1969 canons]
were not relevant to disciplinary actions, but represented attempts to state the
aspirations of the profession or to guide lawyers in making ethical decisions when
no law controlled the lawyers’ conduct. Some of the generalities may have been
embryonic explanations of the roles of lawyers in the legal process. Those
generalities were restated as ethical considerations to serve their proper functions.
This placement also is an aid in avoiding the misuse by disciplinary authorities of
such generalities.”).
16. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 3-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
17. Id. EC 3-9.
18. Id. The full text of EC 3-9 states:
Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the
respective states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in
any jurisdiction is not per se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere,
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690 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
acknowledgment, however, the DRs made no provision for lawyers who
were licensed in one state to perform legal services in a different state. 
When the Model Rules were first promulgated in 1983,19 superseding
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 5.5’s
regulation of multijurisdictional practice was succinct. It tracked former
DR 3-101 and prohibited the practice of law “in a jurisdiction where doing
so violates the regulation of the legal profession.” The rule contained no
exceptions. The Comment to then Model Rule 5.5 stated that the
“definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from
place to place,” and that this rule “protects the public against the rendition
of legal services by unqualified persons.”20 
Scholars immediately criticized Model Rule 5.5. A book published
one year after the 1983 enactment proclaimed that “[i]nterstate practice is
not only a fact of life, it is a frequent and common occurrence.”21 The 
criticism was well-founded because implicit in the tight restrictions
contained in the former formulation of Model Rule 5.5 was that, because
Model Rule 1.1 required competency, the rule treated a lawyer not licensed
in the state as incompetent if the attorney provided legal services in that
state. Creating a categorical ban that essentially deemed all out-of-state 
lawyers incompetent to do work in the state not only was at odds with
Model Rule 1.1, it also elevated geography (where one was admitted to
and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not 
permitted by law or by court order to do so. However, the demands of
business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the 
regulation of the practice of law by the states. In furtherance of the public
interest, the legal profession should discourage regulation that 
unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to
handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to
obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all matters including the
presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer
is not permanently admitted to practice.
19. It has been contended that “[t]he 1983 ABA Model Rules were adopted
amidst contentious disagreements about the scope and content of the rules, in
addition to continued opposition to the necessity of a revision of the ABA Model 
Code in the first place.” Jane Y. Kim, Refusing to Settle: A Look at the Attorney’s
Ethical Dilemma in Client Settlement Decisions, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 383,
395 (2012).
20. Robert H. Aronson, Washington Survey: An Overview of the Law of 
Professional Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and
Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823, 882 n.315 (1986).
21. L. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 646 (2d ed.1984).
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6912021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
practice) over competency (the knowledge sufficient to render the legal
advice sought).22 
In 2000, the ABA established the Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice (the MJP Commission) with the aim of making recommendations
to supplement the report of the “Ethics 2000” Commission.23 The MJP
Commission held a symposium about multijurisdictional practice. An 
article about the symposium by one of its participants noted that “outside
the context of litigation,”24 the scope of unauthorized-practice-of-law 
prohibitions “is vastly uncertain as well as, potentially, far too
restrictive.”25 
22. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2019); id. r. 5.5. For more on this issue under the current formulation of the Model
Rules, see infra Part IV. For a discussion of the evolution of the competency issue,
see Garth, supra note 13, which stated: 
“Competence” appeared as a subject of explicit professional regulation
for the first time in 1969 as a canon of professional ethics. The specific
term, however, is not defined in the Canons, nor is it defined in the
current Code of Professional Responsibility. In the Code, ethical
considerations, which have only an “aspirational” quality, prescribe that 
the lawyer “act with competence and proper care,” keep “abreast of
current legal literature and developments,” and “prepare adequately for
and give appropriate attention to his legal work.” Incompetence becomes
a matter for discipline only if the lawyer handles a matter that “he knows
or should know he is not competent to handle,” fails to undertake
“preparation adequate in the circumstances,” or “neglects a legal matter
entrusted to him.”
***
The A.B.A.’s proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, proffered
in revised form in 1981 by the Kutak Commission as potential successors
to the Code, respond to the concern with upgrading. Competence is
placed first among all ethical requirements. Further, according to Model
Rule 1.1, “competence consists of the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, preparation and efficiency reasonably necessary for the
representation.”
23. Don Burnett, Multijurisdictional Practice: An Emerging Issue for a
Changing Profession, 46-JUN ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 33 (2003).
24. Bruce A. Green, The Need to Bring the Professional Regulation of
Lawyers into the 21st Century, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/profession
al_responsibility/committees_commissions/commission_on_multijurisditional_p 
ractice/mjp_bruce_green_report/ [https://perma.cc/8STK-6GDJ] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2020).
25. Id.
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692 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
26. The ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility maintains a website 
about the Commission and its work. See generally The Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/pro
fessional_responsibility/committees_commissions/commission-on-multijurisdict 
ional-practice/ [https://perma.cc/88PX-DTWP] (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
27. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2013 643 (Art Garwin ed., 2013).
28. DAVID K.Y. TANG, ENDORSEMENT OF THE REPORT OF THE ABA
COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE BY THE ABA SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_migrated/srppt_ 
7_02.doc [https://perma.cc/WYK5-MJ4Q] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). The Chair
of the Section wrote the Commission wrote: 
We think it is noteworthy to add that our Section’s membership,
numbering close to 30,000, is dominated by solo practitioners and
lawyers practicing in small firm settings, and that the issues of
multijurisdictional practice addressed by the Report are issues that the 
majority of our members, regardless of their firms’ size, have struggled
with for years. Our members are regularly asked by their clients, who
may be individuals, small businesses or large multi-state or multi-
national enterprises, to assist such clients beyond the borders of the 
lawyer’s state of licensure, and the degree to which our members are
asked to engage in multijurisdictional representation is not linked to the
size or breadth of their practices.
29. These proposed amendments became the basis for Model Rule 8.5(a). 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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6932021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
in the United States;30 (3) a Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission;31 and 
(4) a Model Rule on Admission by Motion permitting a lawyer to pursue
admission to another jurisdiction’s bar without taking its bar
examination.32 
Additionally, there were two linked changes: an amended Model Rule
6A,33 and a proposed Model Rule 22 promoting reciprocal disciplinary 
enforcement by a state in which the attorney has practiced and the state in
which the attorney is admitted.34 
The ABA House of Delegates in 1983 approved Model Rule 5.5 in its
original form.35 Model Rule 5.5 took its current structure through
amendments passed by the ABA House of Delegates in 2002 based on
recommendations from the Ethics 2000 Commission. The ABA House of
Delegates filed those recommendations in 2001, but the House did not act
on them until 2002, after the House also received the report of the MJP
Commission.36 With a few modifications,37 the current Model Rule 5.5 has 
been in place for almost 20 years.
30. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201J (2002), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_migrate 
d/201j.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSW5-V6P3].
31. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201F (2002), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_migrate 
d/report_201f.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4GA-V5UQ].
32. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201G (2002), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mjp_migrate 
d/report_201g.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2WL-CLNT].
33. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984),
available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enfor 
cement/rule_6/ [https://perma.cc/S2D6-NNNK].
34. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002),
available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enfor 
cement/rule_22 [https://perma.cc/S7XF-73BQ].
35. See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2013, supra note 27.
36. Id. 
37. In 2007 the rule was modified on the recommendation of the ABA 
Standing Committee on Client Protection by adding Comment 14. Id. at 656–57. 
In 2012 on the recommendation of the Commission on Ethics 20/20 to protect
corporate counsel from being charged with the unauthorized practice of law. Id. 
at 643, 657–58. And again in 2013 on the recommendation of the Commission on
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694 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Model Rule 5.5 is showing its age. It was only after the adoption of
the current structure of Model Rule 5.5 that the iPhone debuted,38 that
firms started vigorously eliminating vast libraries filled with books and
using primarily online research tools, that video-conferencing emerged as
a usual and customary way of interacting with clients and potential clients,
and that law firm consolidations continued escalating each year at a record
pace.39 
Given the fact that lawyers today are increasingly asked “by their
clients, who may be individuals, small businesses or large multi-state or
multi-national enterprises, to assist such clients beyond the borders of the
lawyer’s state of licensure,”40 the question that arises is whether the
existing text of Model Rule 5.5 adequately addresses clients’ needs and
appropriately balances those needs with regulating the practice of law.
The evolution of Model Rule 5.5 involves more than just lawyer
mobility: “Applied literally, the old restrictions on practice of law in a state
by a lawyer admitted elsewhere could seriously inconvenience clients who
have need of such services within a state.”41 If a client were always forced 
to retain local counsel, as the original version of Model Rule 5.5 required,
the client would be denied its chosen of counsel and would be subjected
to increased legal fees (at least the amount charged by new counsel for the
time necessary to get acquainted with the matter).42 
Today, Model Rule 5.5 has been broadened and permits transactional
lawyers to engage in the practice of law in which they are not licensed, but
only if the work is “on a temporary basis” and is either “undertaken in
Ethics 20/20 to define the permitted practice areas of lawyers admitted in foreign
countries. Id. at 659–61.
38. The first iPhone was released in 2007. See Dan Grabham & Robert Jones,
History of the iPhone 2007-2017: The Journey to iPhone X, T3 SMARTERLIVING
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.t3.com/us/features/a-brief-history-of-the-iphone
[https://perma.cc/25AL-PMBE].
39. See Roy Strom, After a Record 2017, No Signs of Law Firm Merger
Mania Slowing, AM. LAW. (Jan. 3, 2018, 01:04 PM), https://www.law.com/
americanlawyer/sites/americanlawyer/2018/01/03/after-a-record-2017-no-signs-
of-law-firm-merger-mania-slowing/ [https://perma.cc/G73U-KHU4]. See 
generally Altman Weil Mergerline, ALTMAN WEIL INC., http://www.altmanweil
.com/MergerLine/ [https://perma.cc/24LV-S5YG] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
40. TANG, supra note 28. This comment, which was raised by the ABA’s
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law in a letter to the Commission
before the 2002 report, is even more pertinent now as multistate transactions
continue to proliferate. Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e
(AM. L. INST. 2000).
42. Id.
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association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction”43 
or arises “out of or [is] reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.”44 
Model Rule 5.5 is not the only formulation dealing with lawyers who
are licensed in one state who seek to practice, or whose clients request
them to practice, in another state. The American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses this as well,
as discussed in Sections VI and VII, below. The Restatement permits
transactional lawyers to engage in “extra-judicial practice” if it is
“reasonably related” to the lawyer’s practice in the state(s) where the 
lawyer is licensed—there is no requirement that the work be done there on
a temporary basis.45 
III. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF MODEL RULE 5.5
Model Rule 5.5, as it currently exists, consists of two mandatory 
restrictions—5.5(a) and 5.5(b)—and two exceptions to those
restrictions—5.5(c) and 5.5(d). 
A. Model Rule 5.5(a)
Model Rule 5.5 opens with the broad proclamation in 5.5(a) that a
“lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in
doing so.”46 This requires that practitioners look beyond the scope of the
Model Rule’s adoption in each state, for not only does the rule specifically
omit any definition of the practice of law, but the comments to the rule
note that the definition “varies from one jurisdiction to another.”47 
Moreover, this same comment declares that whatever the definition is,
“limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public
43. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
44. Id. r. 5.5(c)(4).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (AM. L.
INST. 2000).
46. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (emphasis
added).
47. Id. r. 5.5 cmt. 2. For a state-by-state comparison of what constitutes the 
“practice of law,” see the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice
of Law contained in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW APPENDIX A, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/model-def_migrated/model_def_st
atutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD9N-W8NU] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
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696 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.” This
formulation, which applies only to lawyers, appears to treat any lawyer not
licensed in that jurisdiction as unqualified, even though the lawyer is a
well-experienced practitioner, perhaps a recognized expert in one or more
specific practice areas, and licensed in one or more other jurisdictions. 
One might ask how or why a lawyer licensed to practice law in one
state is treated as an “unqualified person” in another state simply because
of a lack of licensing in the second state. After all, under the current
formulation of Model Rule 1.1, competency is a touchstone of any legal
representation,48 and a comment to Model Rule 1.1 acknowledges that a
“lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field
through necessary study.”49 Yet, the comments to Model Rule 5.5 seem to
equate competency with only two areas: work (a) that is “reasonably
related to the lawyers’ practice” in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is
licensed, a criterion that implicitly looks at the laws of the licensing state, 
or (b) that involves a “particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, 
foreign, or international law.”50 In other words, the comments to Model
Rule 5.5, which appear to be implicitly based on the uniqueness of each
state’s law, seem to treat competency in a far narrower fashion than do the
comments to Model Rule 1.1.
B. Model Rule 5.5(b)
While Model 5.5(a) addresses the practice of law in “a jurisdiction,”
Model Rule 5.5(b) prohibits two actions in “this jurisdiction.” 
The first prohibition is against establishing “an office or other
systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of
law.”51 The second prohibition prevents a lawyer who is not licensed in
“this jurisdiction” from holding out to the public or otherwise representing
“that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.” The focus
of this Article is the first prohibition.
As in Model Rule 5.5(a), the “practice of law” is not defined.52 
Additionally, there is no definition of what constitutes a “systematic and
48. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Model Rule 1.1 states: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
49. Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 1.
50. Id. r. 5.5 cmt. 14. 
51. Id. r. 5.5(b)(1) (emphasis added).
52. Id. r. 5.5(a). For a discussion of the difficulty in arriving at consensus as 
to what constitutes the practice of law, see discussion supra note 10.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  25 4/26/21  8:53 AM
















      
   
   
 
           
    
     
 















    
  
  




   
 
6972021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
continuous presence,” although apparently it is something other than a
presence that is “temporary,” a matter dealt with in Model Rule 5.5(c). The
comments to Model Rule 5.5, however, make it clear that presence “may
be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present
here.”53 
While the comments to Model Rule 5.5 do not reference the origin of
the term “systematic and continuous,” the phrase “continuous and
systematic” has a long jurisprudential history in cases dealing with the
general jurisdiction of federal courts. International Shoe54 established the
rule that a court “may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state
or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them
when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”55 The jurisdictional
criteria for “continuous and systematic” contacts usually include both
physical presence and the active solicitation of business in the state.56 
53. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
54. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
55. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011).
56. See Ashbury Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc., No. 11-CV-79, 2012
WL 4325183 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012). As was stated in Ashbury International
Group, Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc.:
In applying the “continuous and systematic” contacts test, courts have
focused on two areas. First, they look for some kind of deliberate
physical presence in the forum state, such as corporate facilities, bank
accounts, agents, registration, or incorporation. In this regard, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) “remains [t]he textbook case
of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation
that has not consented to suit in the forum.” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2856
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). . . .
In addition to looking for elements of physical presence, courts have also
considered whether the defendant has actively solicited business in the 
forum state and the extent to which the defendant has participated in the
state’s economic markets. See Tuazon v. R .J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (listing, as indicia of continuous and
systematic contacts, “volume,” “economic impact,” “continuity,” and
“integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets”). In other
words, courts have examined the “economic reality” of the defendant’s
activities in the forum state. Id. at 1173 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Co., 
90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir.1996) (cited with approval in Delta Sys.,
Inc. v. Indak Mfg. Corp., 4 F. App’x 857, 860 (Fed.Cir. 2001)) (listing,
as relevant to the general jurisdiction analysis, whether the defendant
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  26 4/26/21  8:53 AM
















    




   
   
  
    









   
  
 
   
 





698 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Goodyear Dunlop Tires57 put an 
additional gloss on International Shoe, holding that foreign subsidiaries of
a U.S. parent corporation are not amenable to suit in state court on claims
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires noted that a pure “stream of commerce” theory fails to
distinguish between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.58 Cases
decided after Goodyear Dunlop Tires have found general jurisdiction over
foreign entities when the foreign entity has actively solicited work in that
state even if there is no physical presence and even if the percentage of
actively solicits business in the state and the volume of business
conducted in the state by the defendant).
57. Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915.
58. As was stated in Goodyear:
The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the
essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general)
jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum, we have
explained, may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction.
See, e.g., World–Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S., at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559
(where “the sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence,
but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve . . . the market for its product in [several] States, it is not 
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner
or to others” (emphasis added)). But ties serving to bolster the exercise
of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on
those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant. See, e.g., 
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty.
Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203, n. 5 (C.A.D.C.1981) (defendants’ marketing
arrangements, although “adequate to permit litigation of claims relating
to [their] introduction of . . . wine into the United States stream of
commerce, . . . would not be adequate to support general, ‘all purpose’
adjudicatory authority”).
A corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within a state,” 
International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that
the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U.S.,
at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154. Our 1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co. remains “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented
to suit in the forum.” Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., 652 
F.2d 1032, 1037 (C.A.D.C.1981).
Id. at 927–28.
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6992021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
work in the “local” state is small in comparison to the entity’s overall
work.59 
Model Rule 5.5(b) is not one of jurisdiction, however. Model Rule 8.5
grants local disciplinary bodies authority over all attorneys who practice
in the state, whether on a temporary basis or otherwise, regardless of the
state in which they are licensed. All Model Rule 5.5 does is to delineate
certain “safe harbors” for attorneys who are not licensed in the local
jurisdiction but who wish to perform one or more legal functions in that
jurisdiction.
Some have argued that the text of Model Rule 5.5(b) contains a narrow
and circumscribed view of what is “systematic and continuous.” They
assert that the phrase “for the practice of law” in Model Rule 5.5(b)(1)’s
prohibition against establishing “an office or other systematic and
continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law” requires 
that one read the italicized language as limiting the test of “systematic and
59. Id. As was stated in Hess v. Bumbo Int’l Tr., 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 595– 
96 (S.D. Tex. 2013):
In fact, Bumbo’s contacts with Texas surpass those present in other post-
Goodyear cases in which district courts have found general jurisdiction
over foreign entities. See, e.g., Ruben v. United States, 918 F.Supp.2d 
358, 360–61 (E.D.Pa.2013) (finding general jurisdiction over an
architecture firm that had several high-profile projects in Pennsylvania,
but had no office, bank accounts, or property in Pennsylvania and
derived only 1% of its U.S. revenue there); Ashbury Int’l Grp., Inc. v.
Cadex Def., Inc., No. 3:11 CV00079, 2012 WL 4325183, at **7–8 
(W.D.Va. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding general jurisdiction based on
defendant’s targeted solicitation of Virginia-based customers and the
extent to which defendant profited from participating in the state’s
market for military equipment). The facts of this case put it in
comfortable company with those, and especially with McFadden v.
Fuyao N. Am., Inc., No. 10–CV–14457, 2012 WL 1230046 (E.D.Mich.
Apr. 12, 2012), where the Eastern District of Michigan found general
jurisdiction over a Chinese windshield manufacturer that had contracted
with a nonparty wholesale customer (General Motors) in the forum over
a number of years. Id. at *5. General Motors’ buyer would create 
contracts with the manufacturer, which allowed GM plants throughout
the United States to send purchase orders for windshields that were then
shipped from China to the defendant’s subsidiary in Michigan. Id. at *3.
In McFadden, as in this case, the defendant regularly interacted with the
in-forum customer concerning the management of the flow of goods into
the forum, thus distinguishing that case from Goodyear and allowing a
finding of continuous and systematic contacts. Id. at *4 (“[The
defendant] has done more than ‘merely placing a product into the stream
of commerce destined for the United States.’”).
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700 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
continuous presence” to those whose primary purpose is the practice of
law. They argue that those who telecommute from a lengthy stay in a hotel
or vacation home in another state are not engaging in a “systematic and
continuous presence” for the practice of law but that rather the practice is
incidental to the vacation. This same argument would support the notion
that a lawyer who lives in one state where the attorney is not licensed and
telecommutes every day to give advice to clients in the state where the
lawyer is licensed is outside the scope of Model Rule 5.5(b)(1)’s
prohibition. These contentions contain two underlying problems. First,
given the fact that the comments to the Model Rules recognize that a
“[p]resence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not
physically present here,”60 it is difficult to believe that actual physical
presence in a state, when the lawyer is actually doing legal work from a
hotel, vacation home, or actual home and billing for it, is not truly 
“presence.” Second, this type of argument fails to consider the impact of
the legal work done. For example, should there be a difference between:
(i) a lawyer who spends a month in a state (in which the lawyer is
not licensed) on a transactional deal and bills the client $25,000
for the work performed while there, which the client is happy to
pay;61 
(ii) a lawyer who spends one day in a state (in which the lawyer is
not licensed) on a transactional deal, performs a stupendous job
for the client, and bills the client $25,000 for the work performed
there, which the client is happy to pay;
(iii) a lawyer staying at a hotel (in a state in which the lawyer is
not licensed) with family for a month and billing clients $5,000
for the work performed there;
(iv) a lawyer who has a vacation home (in a state in which the
lawyer is not licensed) and bills clients three hours a month for
legal work while there; and
(v) a lawyer who lives in State A (where she is not licensed), but
all of her work is done through telecommuting to an office in State
B (where she is licensed) and all of her work involves only the law
of State B? 
60. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
61. Is there a real difference to the local market of attorneys between
situations (i) and (ii)? Why, when the fee is the same and the results of the work
are the same, does the current text of Model Rule 5.5(b) prohibit the actions of the
lawyer who spends a month in the state on a transaction but permit the actions of
a lawyer who spends a day in the state? See generally id. r. 5.5(b).
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7012021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
While these issues are explored further in this Article, suffice it to say
that reading the phrase “for the practice of law” as a specific limitation on
“systematic and continuous” requires delving into a mixture of objective
factors, the subjective intention of the lawyer, and a consideration of each
state’s own definition of the “practice of law.”62 
62. See Opinion 2004-6, PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION (2004),
https://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion2004-6?appNum=2
[https://perma.cc/J3JL-QZXP] (holding that an immigration attorney whose
practice is limited to immigration courts may have an office in Pennsylvania
without being admitted as a member of the bar of that state, and this office may
be “in a partnership with a Pennsylvania admitted attorney”); Opinion 597, TEXAS
CENTER FOR LEGAL ETHICS (May 2010), https://www.legalethicstexas.com/ 
Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-597 [https://perma.cc/ATJ5-6U8Y] (“Under
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, a Texas lawyer may
practice law as a member of a law firm with lawyers who are licensed only in
jurisdictions other than Texas and who practice law in offices of the law firm
located outside of Texas. The Texas lawyer does not improperly assist in the 
unauthorized practice of law when non-Texas lawyers, who are members of the
law firm duly licensed in another jurisdiction and who normally practice in offices
of the law firm outside of Texas, from time to time provide, in compliance with
any applicable local rules and without themselves establishing a systematic and
continuous presence in Texas, legal services in Texas as members of the law 
firm.”); ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINION NO. 12-09 (2012), https:// 
www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB4
N-DD7N] (holding that a non-Illinois lawyer violates Rule 5.5(b) when the
attorney lives in Illinois, is not licensed in Illinois but rather by another state and
shares an office in Illinois with an Illinois-licensed attorney. This is so even if (a)
the letterhead and marketing materials clearly indicate which attorney is licensed
in which state, and (b) only the Illinois-licensed attorney handles matters in
Illinois courts, conducts all Illinois real estate closings, and the firm clearly
indicates which lawyer is licensed in which state); Opinion #189: Unauthorized
Practice of Law in Maine by Admittees of Foreign Jurisdiction, STATE OF MAINE
BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR (Nov. 15, 2005), https: //www.mebaroverseers
.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=87369 [https://perma.cc/DE8J-73EE]
(holding that a lawyer who is not licensed in Maine but has a Maine office with
Maine-licensed attorneys violates Rule 5.5(b) even if the letterhead clearly
indicates that the state of the lawyer’s license and the lawyer’s practice is “self-
limited to legal services concerning ‘international and domestic energy and utility
law’”); ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS OPINION 2010-1 (2010), https://
alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2010-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XSR-3H3D]
(holding that a lawyer living in Alaska and whose office is there but whose 
practice is restricted to immigration matters does not violate the Alaska rules if
the “lawyer clearly advises his clients that he is not an Alaska lawyer and avoids
advising regarding legal issues outside of immigration law”); OHIO BOARD OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, OPINION 2016-9 (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.ohio
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702 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The thrust of Model Rule 5.5(b) appears to be directed at preventing
lawyers licensed in another state from informing the public that they are 
available to be retained “in this jurisdiction.” No rationale is given for this
restriction in the comments, and it could be argued that Model Rule 5.5(b)
is directed more at protecting lawyers “in this jurisdiction” from
competition of equally competent lawyers from other jurisdictions,
because not only does Model Rule 5.5(b)(2) warn lawyers not to “hold out
to the public” that they are “admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction,”
but also the comments to the rule note that Model Rule 7.1, which
addresses advertising, must be consulted.63 
C. Model Rule 5.5(c)
Model Rule 5.5(c) deals with lawyers who “provide legal services on
a temporary basis in this jurisdiction.” It is intended to be a contrast to
advop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Op_16-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/927P-
GKLQ] (stating in its Syllabus of Opinion: “An out-of-state lawyer who is
admitted and in good standing in another United States jurisdiction, and also is
admitted or authorized by law to appear before a federal court or agency in Ohio,
may maintain an office or other systematic and continuous presence in Ohio. An
out-of-state lawyer who is engaged in a federal practice and maintains a physical
office in Ohio, may not provide legal services based on Ohio law to clients. The
letterhead of a lawyer not licensed to practice law in Ohio, engaged in a federal
practice, and who maintains an office or other systematic and continuous
presence, may include the designation ‘Attorney at Law,’ but must identify the
federal courts or agencies to which the lawyer is admitted or permitted to appear
and include an appropriate disclaimer regarding his or her jurisdictional
limitations.”); Sylvia Stevens, A UPL Conundrum: Where to Draw the
Boundaries on Out-of-State Practice, OREGON STATE BAR (June 2007),
https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07jun/barcounsel.html [https://perm
a.cc/7XL2-F3SH] (concluding that a New York lawyer is practicing law on a
“systematic and continuous basis” in Oregon in violation of Rule 5.5 if he moves
to Oregon, establishes an office in his Oregon home “to serve his New York firm’s
clients on various legal matters” and “all correspondence is by e-mail through the
New York firm’s server; the lawyer is also able to send other correspondence
remotely to staff at the New York firm who then print it on the New York firm’s
letterhead.” The article goes on to state: “Handling a matter involving New York
law or New York residents is not the same as practicing ‘in’ New York. The
jurisdiction in which a lawyer practices is determined by where she is physically
located when performing the legal services. If the locus of the client or the
applicable law determined where one was practicing, there would be no need for
rules like RPC 5.5, which are exceptions to the general rule that a lawyer not 
licensed in a jurisdiction cannot provide legal services there.”).
63. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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lawyers whose presence in a state is “systematic and continuous” (Model
Rule 5.5(b)), although the word “temporary” is not defined. 
Model Rule 5.5(c) contains four subparts, two that apply to litigators
and those representing clients in tribunal or other proceedings—Model
Rule 5.5(c)(2) and (c)(3) —and two that apply to all lawyers, whether they
are litigators or transactional lawyers—Model Rule 5.5(c)(1) and (c)(4).
The litigator provisions, 5.5(c)(2) and (c)(3), provide that temporary
practice in the state is acceptable if a lawyer has obtained or “reasonably
expects”64 to receive pro hac vice status, or is authorized to appear in a
tribunal proceeding “by other law.”65 Likewise, even if pro hac admission
is not required, temporary practice in an “arbitration, mediation, or other
alternative dispute resolution proceeding”66 is acceptable, but only if “the
services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.”67 
The other two subparts of Model Rule 5.5—(c)(1) and (c)(4)—appear
to implicitly assume that the law of the state where a lawyer is not licensed
to practice is so strange and unique that a lawyer cannot competently
provide services in that state. Model Rule 5.5(c)(1) hinges permissible
temporary practice on associating with “a lawyer who is admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter.”
Model Rule 5.5(c)(4), the catch-all provision to be used when no other
subpart of 5.5 applies, permits temporary practice only for matters that
“arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.” Comment 14 to
Model Rule 5.5 makes it clear that the ABA considers this “reasonably
related” test to encompass only two areas: (1) work that is part of a “body
of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law,”68 or (2) work 
that deals primarily with the law of the state in which the lawyer is
licensed.69 Thus, a lawyer who is a national expert in mergers and
64. Id. r. 5.5(c)(2).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. r. 5.5(c)(3).
68. Id. r. 5.5(c)(1) cmt. 14 (emphasis added).
69. Comment 14 states:
Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors evidence such a relationship. The
lawyer’s client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or
may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is admitted. The matter, although involving other
jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction. In
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  32 4/26/21  8:53 AM





    




   
  
  
   
  
   
 
 







   
  
   
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
       
       
      
     
    
 
 
     
   
704 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
acquisitions, leasing, or insurance is not within the protected categories of
Model Rule 5.5(c)(4), for none of these matters are nationally uniform,
even though that lawyer may be among the country’s most experienced
practitioners in these areas, regardless of which state law applies to the
matter.
D. Model Rule 5.5 Has Not Been Uniformly Adopted by the States70 
Although the goal of the ABA’s promulgation of the Model Rules is
to create uniformity across the country, the fact that a number of states
have not adopted the ABA’s approach verbatim71 shows both the
limitations of the current text and the desire of many states to have a more
flexible multijurisdictional test than the one set forth in the current version
of Model Rule 5.5.72 A detailed chart of each state’s formulation of Model
other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer’s work might be conducted
in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the
law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the
client’s activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such
as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential
business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the
relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the
lawyer’s recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of
law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal,
nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. Lawyers desiring to
provide pro bono legal services on a temporary basis in a jurisdiction that 
has been affected by a major disaster, but in which they are not otherwise 
authorized to practice law, as well as lawyers from the affected
jurisdiction who seek to practice law temporarily in another jurisdiction,
but in which they are not otherwise authorized to practice law, should
consult the [Model Court Rule on Provision of Legal Services Following
Determination of Major Disaster]. 
Id. 
70. See Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics
Leadership: State Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637 (2005).
71. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
COMMITTEE, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: RULE 5.5 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
PRACTICE OF LAW (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U7PX-W4CM].
72. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence
of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5—An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON 
L. REV. 729 (2010).
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7052021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Rule 5.5 can be found on the website of the ABA’s Center for Professional
Responsibility.73 The chart shows that 42 states have not adopted Model
Rule 5.5 intact and that a number of states have made substantial changes
to the overall Model Rule 5.5 treatment. 
Among the more notable reformulations of Model Rule 5.5 are those
of Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, New Jersey, and North Carolina. 
The Colorado version of Model Rule 5.5 contains a cross-reference to
Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 205.1, which essentially is a limited
“driver’s license” provision for transactional lawyers. Under that rule, a
lawyer in good standing in another state can practice in Colorado as long
as the attorney is not a Colorado domiciliary, does not accept or solicit
Colorado clients, does not represent to the public that the attorney is
practicing law in the state, and has “not established a place for the regular
practice of law in Colorado.”74 In other words, the Colorado rules protect
transactional lawyers but prohibit telecommuting because if the lawyer has
“established domicile in Colorado,” the rule’s protection does not apply.
Arizona takes a different approach. Out-of-state lawyers “may provide
legal services in Arizona that exclusively involve federal law, the law of
73. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
COMMITTEE, supra note 71.
74. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 205.1 states, in part:
(1) Eligibility. An attorney who meets the following conditions is an out-
of-state attorney for the purpose of this rule:
(a) The attorney is licensed to practice law and is on active
status in another jurisdiction in the United States;
(b) The attorney is a member in good standing of the bar of all
courts and jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted to practice;
(c) The attorney has not established domicile in Colorado; and
(d) The attorney has not established a place for the regular
practice of law in Colorado from which the attorney holds himself
or herself out to the public as practicing Colorado law or solicits or
accepts Colorado clients.
(2) Scope of Authority. An out-of-state attorney may practice law in
Colorado except that an out-of-state attorney who wishes to appear in
any state court of record must comply with C.R.C.P. 205.3 concerning
pro hac vice admission and an out-of-state attorney who wishes to appear
before any administrative tribunal must comply with C.R.C.P. 205.4
concerning pro hac vice admission before state agencies. An out-of-state 
attorney who engages in the practice of law in Colorado pursuant to this
rule shall be deemed to have obtained a license for the limited scope of
practice specified in this rule.
COLO. R. CIV. P. 205.1.
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706 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
another jurisdiction, or tribal law,”75 but these lawyers must “advise the
lawyer’s client that the lawyer is not admitted to practice in Arizona, and
must obtain the client’s informed consent to such representation.”76 
Nevada’s version of Model Rule 5.5 provides that the “lawyer who is
not admitted in this jurisdiction, but who is admitted and in good standing
in another jurisdiction of the United States, does not engage in the
unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when,”77 among other
things, the lawyer’s work in the state is on an “occasional basis” and “is
acting with respect to a matter that is incident to work being performed in 
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted” 78 or “is acting with respect
to a matter that is incident to work being performed in a jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer is admitted, provided that the lawyer is acting in this
jurisdiction on an occasional basis and not as a regular or repetitive course
of business in this jurisdiction.”79 
New Jersey’s version of Model Rule 5.5 specifically addresses
transactional lawyers and permits a lawyer from outside of the state to
engage in the negotiation “of the terms of a transaction in furtherance of
the lawyer’s representation on behalf of an existing client in a jurisdiction
in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and the transaction originates
in or is otherwise related to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted
to practice”80 as long as the attorney consents in writing to a New Jersey 
Supreme Court form concerning service of process; however, even if the
form is not signed, the attorney “shall be deemed to have consented to such
appointment.”81 
75. ARIZ. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(d) (2014), available at https://
www.azbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/rules-of-professional-conduct/ [https://perma.
cc/BTX4-AHLC].
76. Id. r. 5.5(f).
77. NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (2006), available at https://
www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/RPC.html [https://perma.cc/9RS9-V2EX].
78. Id. r. 5.5(b)(3)–(4).
79. Id. r. 5.5(b)(4).
80. N.J. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(b)(3)(i) (2009), available at https://
www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/rules/rpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EYA-U7NU].
81. Id. r. 5.5(c)(3). New Jersey Rule 5.5(c)(3)–(4) states: 
(c) A lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction who acts in this
jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (b) above shall: . . . (3) consent in
writing on a form approved by the Supreme Court to the appointment of
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as agent upon whom service of process
may be made for all actions against the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm that 
may arise out of the lawyer’s participation in legal matters in this
jurisdiction, except that a lawyer who acts in this jurisdiction pursuant to
subparagraph (b)(3)(ii) or (b)(3)(iii) above shall be deemed to have
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7072021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
North Carolina’s formulation of Model Rule 5.5 maintains the Model
Rule’s prohibition on establishing an office or engaging in “systematic and
continuous” presence, but it does away with the Model Rule’s discussion
of temporary practice and instead focuses on whether the work “arises out
of or is otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer’s representation of a
client in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and the
lawyer’s services are not services for which pro hac vice admission is
required.”82 
While the rules of these five states (Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, New
Jersey, and North Carolina) differ both from Model Rule 5.5 and each
other, they share to one degree or another the Model Rule’s antipathy to
out-of-state lawyers advising in-state clients of the law of that state, even
though there is no express prohibition against a lawyer doing so while
sitting at the lawyer’s desk in a state where the lawyer is licensed. 
Not every rule that affects lawyers, however, has the same concern.
The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers takes a different approach, as discussed in Section VII, below. 
IV. THE MYTH OF THE STAY-AT-HOME LAWYER83 
As far back as 1938, noted legal scholar Karl Llewellyn wrote that the
“problem of unauthorized practice of law is a problem of using the
processes of the law to define and protect a monopoly.”84 He stated, “The 
Bar complains of ‘overcrowding.’ This means, in horse-sense terms, ‘not
enough income to go around comfortably.’”85 He also recognized that
parochialism played a role: just because a local lawyer is trained in local
law does not necessarily mean that the local lawyer is the best one to give
the client the best, or even the most competent, representation. Llewellyn
consented to such appointment without completing the form; (4) not hold
himself or herself out as being admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction . . . .
82. N.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (2016), available at https://www
.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/rules-of-professional-conduct/rule-55-unauthorize 
d-practice-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/QC8A-SKLW].
83. See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking around the Legal Profession:
Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 665 (1995). Professor Wolfram was also the Reporter for the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
84. K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar’s Troubles, and Poultices — and Cures?, 5 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 104 (1938).
85. Id. at 109.
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708 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
noted that the advice to “‘[c]onsult your neighborhood lawyer’ will not
work. Either he does not exist, or else too often he is hardly the man to
consult.”86 Scholarly criticism about multijurisdictional practice
restrictions continues to assert that “the real motivation, one strongly
suspects, has to do with the economic threat posed for in-state lawyers”87 
by out-of-state lawyers.88 
86. Id. at 122.
87. Id.
88. Cf. RICHARD ZITRIN, CAROL M. LANGFORD & NINA W. TARR, LEGAL 
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (3d ed. 2007). “It is generally recognized that 
New Jersey tries to be tough on bar admissions to discourage lawyers from New
York and Pennsylvania, both bigger neighbors with large legal centers, from
invading their courts en masse.” Id. at 854; see also Quintin Johnstone,
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law: Its Prevalence and Its Risks, 74 CONN. BAR
J. 343 (2000). Commenting on remarks made during a symposium held in
Connecticut on multijurisdictional practice:
From the views expressed at the symposium there appear to be sharp
differences of opinion within the Connecticut bar on existing legal
restrictions on multijurisdictional law practice, differences that 
apparently also prevail in all states. Many small-firm lawyers, it seems,
strongly favor the legal restrictions now in effect and are pleased with
the post-Birbrower possibilities of stricter enforcement of
multijurisdictional practice laws. These lawyers are especially concerned
about the prospect of greater out-of-state competition from any cutback
of existing legal restrictions on multijurisdictional practice. This concern
may be greater among small-firm Connecticut lawyers near the New
York border but Connecticut is geographically such a small state that this
“border” vulnerability seemingly extends throughout the state. Enhanced
competition, however, is not the only reason many small-firm lawyers
oppose liberalizing current legal restrictions on multijurisdictional law 
practice. They are aware of shoddy legal work that too often occurs when
out-of-state lawyers, lawyers who often lack sufficient knowledge of
Connecticut law, come into the state to handle matters governed by
Connecticut law. Complex real estate transactions were cited as among
the kinds of matters where this too often occurs.
From what was said at the symposium, those most opposed to existing
legal restrictions on multijurisdictional law practice are house counsel.
They argue that the current law is an anachronism, given the national and
international character of today’s economy. As one house counsel 
commentator said, the existing legal restrictions on multijurisdictional 
practice are so unrealistic as to fail the “you must be kidding test.” 
Moreover, he added, if these laws are strictly enforced in Connecticut, 
his company might consider moving its home office out of the state. The 
large-firm lawyers in attendance at the symposium were less vehement
in their opposition but they too consider the existing law anachronistic 
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7092021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Despite the restrictions, multijurisdictional practice is an almost
everyday occurrence for many transactional lawyers and for every lawyer
who telecommutes. As one court pointed out more than a decade ago: “In
the information age, geographic boundaries are dissipating and the nature
of legal practice is changing. Attorneys, who are licensed to practice on a
state-by-state basis, now draft and circulate documents as e-mail
attachments across traditional jurisdictions.”89 
Today it is not only documents that are emailed across the country for
signature locally. Forty-seven states have enacted the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA).90 It ensures that “electronic signatures,
electronic records, and contracts based or memorialized in electronic
formats”91 are enforceable and cannot be rejected “merely because of their
electronic nature.”92 The Federal ESIGN act93 provides enforceability of
electronic signatures under certain conditions, allows for electronic
and in need of extensive modification. So the Connecticut bar is badly
split on the matter. Moreover, small-firm support of the present law may
intensify as more small-firm lawyers are alerted to the possible adverse
consequences for them if the law is modified. And numerically, small-
firm lawyers greatly outnumber the large-firm and house counsel
lawyers in Connecticut and in other states, which can make them
powerful adversaries in any contest over legal change.
Id. at 353–54.
89. Richards & O’Neil, LLP v. Conk, 774 N.E.2d 540, 549 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (Najam, J., concurring).
90. See Electronic Transactions Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (1999),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=2
c04b76c-2b7d-4399-977e-d5876ba7e034 [https://perma.cc/2KMX-32SU].
91. Guidance Note Regarding the Relationship Between the Electronic 
Transactions Act and Federal ESign Act, Blockchain Technology, and “Smart





93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–31.
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710 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
notarization,94 and specifies the circumstances in which state enactments
of the uniform version of UETA can supersede ESIGN rules.95 
Model Rule 1.1 requires that a lawyer “shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.”96 The comments to Model Rule 1.1 require
competence in the “relevant technology.”97 Most law firms have dispensed
with the bulk of their physical law libraries—vast areas of the office
formerly filled with dusty books98— and almost all lawyers employ online 
electronic legal research giving them access to all the cases, statutes, and
regulations in every state at the touch of a finger.99 Gone are the days when
94. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7001(g). ESIGN Act § 7001(g) states: 
If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires a signature or record
relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce to
be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, that
requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person
authorized to perform those acts, together with all other information
required to be included by other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of
law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.
95. See id. § 7002.
96. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
97. See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8.
98. See, e.g., Mark C. Palmer, The Great Shrinking, Expanding Law Library, 
2CIVILITY (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.2civility.org/expanding-law-library/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q3MG-TKDJ]; see also Wilhelmina Randtke & Stacy Fowler,
The Current State of E-Books in U.S. Law Libraries: A Survey, 108 LAW LIBR. J.
361 (2016); Tina M. Brooks, Franklin L. Runge & Beau Steenken, The Future of
Law Libraries, 80 BENCH & BAR 18 (2016), available at https://uknowledge.uky
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=law_facpub_pop [https://perma
.cc/TCB7-J762].
99. For example, see an article written in 2002 before the development of the
iPhone, iPad, and the ubiquity of smart phones and tablet computers: Christine R.
Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in
Today’s Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1339–40 (2002), stating:
The legal profession has entered a time in which lawyers have access to
a wealth of information through the rapid increase in technological
development. For example, a Florida lawyer vacationing in Europe can
pull out his Palm Pilot and conduct research for a case pending back
home simply by plugging the device into his cellular phone. Another
lawyer in New York can access the Internet and research just about any
area of the law in any part of the world. With relative speed, he can learn
how to write a will in Oregon or draft articles of incorporation in
California. A lawyer can easily contact a friend or partner in another state
via e-mail or telephone and obtain advice regarding the law in another
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a lawyer had a difficult time figuring out the laws in another jurisdiction.
In fact, those materials have been online for more than two decades.100 
Today transactions are multistate and multinational. One might
question whether clients are better served by having a plethora of lawyers
in each state where they might do business and bearing the costs of this
corps of attorneys101 as opposed to being able to consult with a single
state. A lawyer can now be on the other side of the country but make it
to a local court in a matter of hours after preparing for her case on a
laptop in the airplane.
Also see an article written almost a decade before the Davis article, Mary C. Daly,
Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice—Is Model Rule 8.5 the
Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 733–34 (1995),
which states:
Computer-assisted research has revolutionized multijurisdictional 
research. With the flip of a computer switch, a modem, and a password,
lawyers and law students can now access cases, statutes, and regulations
from the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands within seconds. Furthermore, this material is equally
accessible by subject matter (e.g., business, commercial, criminal justice,
malpractice, tort law, etc.). Accessible subject-matter organization
subtly diminishes the importance of state and local law distinctions, in
favor of a more generic approach to legal reasoning.
Computer-assisted research brings a whole new set of efficiencies to
multijurisdictional practice. No longer is it necessary to maintain
voluminous collections of statutes and cases or to schedule all day trips
to the nearest courthouse or bar association library. Furthermore,
computer-accessed materials are updated more frequently than advance
sheets and pocket parts, thereby offering greater assurances of
timeliness.
100. See Daly, supra note 99; Wolfram, supra note 83, at 674 (“In former
times, it could be difficult to gain access to adequate research materials about the
foreign state’s law. Now those materials are on-line.”).
101. Cf. Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The
Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 135 (2004). While the article is focused on the rules concerning
formal admission to the bar, the article makes a point pertinent here:
Rule changes are not only desirable to ensure constitutionality, but they
are also important for a legal system that has become too expensive for
ordinary people to access. By enlarging the number of lawyers who can
supply legal services, the recommended reforms will help to reduce the
cost of legal services and make these services more widely available.
They would also enable clients to have more freedom in the selection of
legal representatives. Put simply, current rules do clients no favors by
excessively cabining legal work within the borders of a single state.
Id. at 178.
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712 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
lawyer who, although licensed to practice in only one state, has by dint of
learning and experience mastered the relevant provisions nationwide that
might affect the client’s business. One might ask whether concern should 
be focused on making sure the lawyer rendering the advice is competent
to give it rather than focusing either on where the lawyer sits when giving
the advice or where the lawyer is licensed. Because many lawyers have 
reputations that extend beyond the borders of the state in which they are
licensed,102 would clients be better served by being able to rely upon these 
lawyers’ experience and knowledge rather than being compelled to have
to hire an additional lawyer in another state to “help” that experienced
lawyer?
V. THE BIRBROWER CASE
The myth of the stay-at-home lawyer was dispelled, and the quiet
world of transactional lawyers flying under the regulatory radar into states 
where they were not licensed to practice was upended, in 1998 when the
California Supreme Court decided Birbrower v. Superior Court.103 
Birbrower and its progeny have raised the specter of transactional lawyers
being disciplined for helping clients keep costs down in multistate
transactions. Although Birbrower arose under California’s rules that have
since been changed,104 a look at the case is nonetheless instructive.
102. See Finnegan v. Squire Publishers, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989). In this case, the court held that the statute of limitations barred an out-of-
state attorney’s claim of defamation. In the course of the opinion, however, the
court stated:
This court will not adopt the assumption that an attorney’s reputation can
only be injured in the state where the attorney is licensed to practice
law. . . . Damage to a professional’s reputation can occur in a state other
than that in which he is professionally licensed, especially when the 
metropolitan area within which he practices his profession extends into
two states. A professional’s reputation can be damaged in the opinion of
his neighbors and community members, his out-of-state clients or
potential clients, as well as members of the general public in the state in
which the libel per se is published.
Id. at 706.
103. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Ct., 949 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1998).
104. California adopted the numbering system of the Model Rules, but its Rule 
5.5 is a simple statement which its Comment states is to be read as prohibiting
“lawyers from practicing law in California unless otherwise entitled to practice
law in this state by court rule or other law.” CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 5.5
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7132021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Birbrower involved the law firm of Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon
& Frank located in a New York City suburb.105 A client sued the firm,
comprised of New York-licensed lawyers, for malpractice. The firm
counterclaimed for attorney’s fees for work it had performed in both New 
York and California.106 
The California Supreme Court succinctly stated the question
presented: “We must decide whether an out-of-state law firm, not licensed
to practice law in this state, violated [California law] when it performed
legal services in California for a California-based client under a fee
agreement stipulating that California law would govern all matters in the
representation.”107 Given the court’s phrasing of the question, it was little
surprise that the court held that the firm engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law “in” California and that, as a law firm consisting of lawyers
cmt. 1 (2018), available at https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/
New-Rules-of-Professional-Conduct-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3TR-XW5C].
In addition, Rule 9.48 of the California Rules of Court, entitled “Nonlitigating
attorneys temporarily in California to provide legal services,” states:
(c) Permissible activities
An attorney who meets the requirements of this rule and who complies
with all applicable rules, regulations, and statutes is not engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law in California if the attorney: 
(1) Provides legal assistance or legal advice in California to a client
concerning a transaction or other nonlitigation matter, a material 
aspect of which is taking place in a jurisdiction other than California
and in which the attorney is licensed to provide legal services; 
(2) Provides legal assistance or legal advice in California on an issue 
of federal law or of the law of a jurisdiction other than California to
attorneys licensed to practice law in California; or
(3) Is an employee of a client and provides legal assistance or legal
advice in California to the client or to the client’s subsidiaries or
organizational affiliates.
CAL. R. CT. r. 9.48 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 2020), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=nine&linkid=rule9_48 [https:
//perma.cc/V3YQ-YFU8] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
105. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1. As of the date this Article was written, (a) the
firm is now known as Montalbano, Condon & Frank and lists fewer than 15
attorneys on its webpage, Attorneys, MONTALBANO, CONDON, & FRANK, P.C., 
https://www.mcfnylaw.com/Attorneys/ [https://perma.cc/8UZ6-UBGN] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020), and (b) Leonard Birbrower is now the senior partner in a
New York personal injury firm whose website lists fewer than 10 attorneys,
Attorney Profiles, BELDOCK & SAUNDERS, P.C., https://bandbnylaw.com/ 
attorney-profiles/ [https://perma.cc/434R-YHNQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
106. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3.
107. Id. at 2.
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714 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
not admitted in California, it was not permitted to collect fees for services
constituting the practice of law in California. Even though California rules
have been changed and the current formulation of Model Rule 5.5(c)(4)
has obviated the ethical concern that out-of-state lawyers had in handling
arbitrations and mediations, the facts in Birbrower neatly frame the
modern-multijurisdictional quandary transactional lawyers continue to
face.
Starting in 1986, the firm represented Kamal Sandhu, an individual,
and his solely owned New York corporation, ESQ Business Services
(ESQ-NY). Kamal Sandhu’s brother, Iqbal Sanhu, was “the vice
president” of ESQ-NY.108 In 1990, Kamal requested that the firm review
a proposed software marketing and development agreement between ESQ-
NY and Tandem Computers,109 a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in California.110 The signed agreement had a California
choice-of-law provision,111 and it required that disputes arising under the
agreement be resolved by arbitration under the American Arbitration
Association rules.112 The contract also called for the application of
California law and arbitration in California. 
After ESQ-NY signed the agreement, a second business (ESQ-Cal) 
was incorporated in California with Iqbal as “a principal shareholder.”113 
In 1991, ESQ-Cal consulted with the firm’s lawyers about the Tandem
agreement, and, in 1992, ESQ-NY and ESQ-Cal “jointly hired” the firm
to represent them in their dispute with Tandem. The retention was through
a signed contingency fee agreement in New York.114 
The firm’s lawyers traveled to California (Tandem’s principal place
of business) on more than one occasion to meet with ESQ-Cal’s 
accountants and representatives, as well as with Tandem’s representatives,
in order to negotiate resolution of the dispute.115 The Birbrower dissent
noted that the firm’s lawyers also met with officers of ESQ-NY in its trips
to California.116 
The firm initiated arbitration in California with the American
Arbitration Association,117 but the parties agreed to settle the matter prior
108. Id. at 14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 3.
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7152021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
to the arbitration hearing.118 Before that settlement, however, the firm and
its clients renegotiated their fee agreement from a contingency fee,119 but
the clients refused to pay the firm’s bill. In 1994, ESQ-Cal and Iqbal sued 
the firm for malpractice,120 and the firm counterclaimed for the revised
fee.121 Iqbal and ESQ-Cal then amended their complaint to add ESQ-NY 
as a plaintiff.122 
The California Supreme Court found that the firm had engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in California and could not collect fees
rendered for services in California. The majority stated that the firm had
engaged in “extensive practice” in California123 in order to assist ESQ-Cal 
in resolving a dispute between two companies with their principal places
of business in California, ESQ-Cal and Tandem. The full facts of the case,
as augmented by the dissent, however, demonstrate that ESQ-Cal was 
created after its sister corporation (ESQ-NY) signed the initial agreement
and that Iqbal principally owned ESQ-Cal, to whom the firm was
introduced in New York by his involvement with his brother Kamal’s
company, ESQ-NY. Moreover, Iqbal and ESQ-Cal added ESQ-NY, a
long-term New York client of the firm, as a plaintiff in the amended
malpractice action, and ESQ-NY was a defendant in the firm’s cross-
complaint.
The facts in Birbrower demonstrate a modern-multijurisdictional
quandary that exists today. The initial representation—negotiating the
agreement on behalf of New Yorker Kamal and his solely owned New
York corporation with a California-based company—is the kind of matter
that attorneys take on in the usual and customary business of representing
clients in their home state. When the New York-based law firm
incorporated ESQ-Cal as a California entity, this action appeared to be 
covered by the text of current Model Rule 5.5(c)(4), for it arose out of and
was “reasonably related” to the firm’s practice in New York and with its
prior work for Kamal. The third step of the case is the one that the
Birbrower majority found most troubling—the New York firm’s work in 
representing both ESQ-NY and ESQ-Cal in trying to resolve a dispute.
Even though the firm had drafted the agreement in New York on behalf of
118. Id. at 3–4.
119. Id. at 3–4. The original contingency fee called for payment of up to $5
million (1/3 of the $15 million amount sought by the clients); the re-negotiated
amount was a flat fee of $1 million. Id.
120. Id. at 14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 7.
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716 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
its New York clients and was trying to resolve a dispute related to that
agreement, the California Supreme Court held that the firm had engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law and was not entitled to collect any of
its fees generated from practicing law in California. 
The commentary on whether Birbrower represents the correct
approach124 or not125 is voluminous, but the text of current Model Rule
5.5(c)(3) and (4) seems to protect lawyers today if these circumstances
124. See, e.g., Matthew P. Vafidis et al., Birbrower Was Right: Foreign
Attorneys Are Entitled to Appear in International Commercial Arbitrations Held
in California, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 51 (2015); Jack Balderson, Jr., Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court: A Defensible Outcome,
But a Striking Example of the Need to Reform Unauthorized Practice of Law
Provisions, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 871 (1999); William T. Barker,
Extrajurisdictional Practice by Lawyers, 56 BUS. LAW. 1501, 1508 (2001). An
article by Quintin Johnstone states, “What the lawyers in the Birbrower case had
done was similar to what has been a common practice throughout the United
States when lawyers represent clients in matters requiring action in a state where
the lawyers are not admitted.” Johnstone, supra note 88, at 343; see also Heller v.
Circle K Stores, Inc., No. B175801, 2005 WL 1532346 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30,
2005); Colmar, Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003); Dispatch & Tracking Solutions, LLC v. City of San Diego, No. 
2009-00087082, 2016 WL 1407739 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2016) (“We see no
reason why an out-of-state person or entity with sufficient contacts with California 
to be sued in California is any less deserving of the protection from unauthorized
practice of law in California than a California citizen.”); In re Charges of
Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 39302, 884 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 2016)
(“Colorado attorney negotiating via e-mail with Minnesota attorney regarding
Minnesota judgment and Minnesota clients was unauthorized practice of law in
Minnesota.”).
125. See, e.g., Richards & O’Neill, LLP v. Conk, 774 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (Najam, J., concurring).
After all, attorneys from the firm assisted Cullman in the purchase of
Day Dream, an Indiana corporation. And in doing so, attorneys spent two
days in Indiana reviewing documents and communicated regularly
throughout the process with Day Dream’s shareholders. In addition,
Richards & O’Neil attorneys drafted an “opinion letter” for Day Dream
shareholders regarding various aspects of the proposed purchase. And
after disputes arose surrounding the subsequent purchase, Richards &
O’Neil appeared pro hac vice in Indiana courts to defend a lawsuit by
Day Dream and, on another occasion, came to Indiana to interview
witnesses and reviewed documents in connection with a pending New
York arbitration. These contacts with Indiana do not amount to the
unauthorized practice of law.
Id. at 549.
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arise in a state that has adopted the Model Rules. Birbrower illustrates,
however, the trap for the unwary that exists for transactional lawyers any
time they deal with either (1) an out-of-state client, even when that out-of-
state client was an entity that was created after the lawyer became involved
and that was closely connected to the firm’s in-state client, which also was
party to the dispute, or (2) an out-of-state matter for an in-state client.
VI. THE MODEL RULES AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS TAKE SIMILAR APPROACHES TO 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, BUT THEY DIFFER IN RESULT
There are two competing national formulations on multijurisdictional
practice, Model Rule 5.5 and ALI’s Restatement § 3.126 Each serves a 
different purpose. 
The Model Rules reflect the American Bar Association’s view of the
appropriate restrictions on the practice of law. It is ostensibly forward-
looking, in that the ABA theoretically is not bound by previous rules or
theories.127 It is statutory in nature, filled with mandates that lawyers
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (AM. L.
INST. 2000). It states:
A lawyer currently admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide 
legal services to a client: 
(1) at any place within the admitting jurisdiction; 
(2) before a tribunal or administrative agency of another jurisdiction
or the federal government in compliance with requirements for
temporary or regular admission to practice before that tribunal or
agency; and
(3) at a place within a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not 
admitted to the extent that the lawyer’s activities arise out of or are
otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice under
Subsection (1) or (2).
127. See supra Part III for a description of some of the changes to Model Rule 
5.5 over the last five decades, as a discussion of the evolution of the ABA rules,
from the 1908 Canon of Ethics through the present formulation of the Model
Rules is beyond the scope of this Article. While it is true that each iteration of the
rules built on the last versions, transforming what some have said were “rules of
ethics as internal professional norms to rules of ethics as public law,” suffice it to
say that the language of today’s Model Rules is statutory. Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer
Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 926 
(2002). As the Part 14 of the Model Rules Preamble states, the Model Rules 
contain language cast as imperatives (“shall” and “shall not”), along with
permissive provisions (“may”). Hortatory statements (about what a lawyer 
“should” do) are confined to the Comments and “do not add obligations to the
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718 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
“shall” follow, actions that lawyers “shall not” take, and actions that
lawyers “may” take. By contrast, the Restatement attempts to encapsulate
the majority view of the jurisprudence at the time the Restatement was
written; it attempts not to make policy choices but rather to reflect what
the existing law is and should be, as informed by appropriate analysis.128 
Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.” MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble & Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
128. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 3 (AM. L. INST. 2000).
The Foreword to the Restatement by the ALI’s late Director Emeritus, Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., stated:
The scope of this Restatement goes well beyond the scope of the ethics
codes in all jurisdictions . . . . The Restatement addresses issues of civil
liability of lawyers—legal malpractice—whereas the ethics codes 
carefully skirt the relationship between ethical standards and malpractice 
liability. The Restatement recognizes that lawyers can be civilly liable to
third parties—“nonclients”—whereas the ethics codes recognize very
limited responsibilities in that direction. Perhaps most important, the
Restatement recognizes what everyone involved in the ethics codes 
knows (but which the codes properly do not address), namely that the 
remedy of malpractice liability and the remedy of disqualification are
practically of greater importance in most law practice than is the risk of
disciplinary proceedings.
There is another important relationship between the Restatement and the
ethics codes. This is the relationship between decisional law and
statutory law. The Restatement draws heavily on decisional law, while 
the ethics codes in almost all jurisdictions have the form and force of
statutes, or at least administrative regulation.
Id. at Foreword (emphasis added). In former ALI Director Herbert
Wechsler’s seminal article on the American Law Institute, he argued that a
Restatement should consider not only the current state of the jurisprudence,
but in areas where the jurisprudence is unsettled or non-existent, a 
Restatement should consider all the facts that a common law court would.
See Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy
in the Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L. J.
185, 191–92 (1968) (“[I]n our system of case law any statement that the law
is such and such is more than an empirical finding that the decisions have so
held. It implies a normative assertion as to what should now be held, if and
when the question is presented . . . . [This] permits the Restatements to
attempt to be what they been and are in fact, a modest but essential aid in the 
improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth and adaptation of the
common law.”); see also John G. Fleming, The Restatements and
Codification, 2 JEWISH L. ANN. 108, 115 (1979) (“It must be conceded at the
outset that the Restatements, even more than statutory Codes, attract the
common criticism that they do not project into the future or even use the
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7192021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Both Model Rule 5.5 and Restatement § 3 permit multijurisdictional
practice, but they approach it from different angles. The primary thrust of
the Model Rule focuses on whether the practice in another state is 
“systematic and continuous” (in which case it is broadly prohibited) or
whether it is temporary (in which case it is permitted, but only within
limited restrictions). The Model Rules permit a transactional attorney to
work in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not licensed as long as the
activities “arise out of or are reasonably related” to the lawyer’s practice
in the licensing state.129 While Restatement § 3 uses this identical phrase
in determining when “extra-judicial” practice is permissible, it does so
without any requirement in the black letter of § 3 that the work be
temporary,130 although Restatement § 3’s comment (e) notes the fact that,
opportunity of reforming the law.”). Professor Charles Wolfram, the Reporter
for the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, described the process
underpinning the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: 
It may help at the outset to attempt some understanding of what a
Restatement aims to be—at least in the view of the ALI. Important in
this respect is the history of the Institute, which was established with the
idea implied by the name of its founding committee, “The Committee on
the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of
the Law.” The ALI’s certificate of incorporation claims that “[t]he
particular business and objects of the society are educational, and are to
promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs, [and] to secure the better administration of
justice.” Notwithstanding the rather clear implication that the work of
this organization would consist of more than meekly parroting existing
law, the ALI perennially witnesses struggles over the concept of a
Restatement.
Often heard in debates is the cry that the ALI should hew to the majority
of decisions. (This is often asserted without regard to the fact that only a
handful of jurisdictions has passed on the point in question.) Opposed,
of course, is the view—which we have striven to follow in the
Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers—that a substantive position
in a Restatement is warranted as “restating” the law if it can be rested
on the support of at least one decision in an American jurisdiction.
Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818–19 (1998) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
129. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(c)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
130. THOMAS MORGAN, LAWYER LAW: COMPARING THE ABA MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH THE ALI RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS (2005). It states: 
The Restatement undertook to describe the practical rule that had
evolved over time, saying that a lawyer could not open an office or seek
clients in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer was unlicensed, but the
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720 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
for transactional lawyers, “there is no equivalent of temporary admission
pro hac vice”131 for counseling or advising clients in a state where the 
lawyer is not licensed. Comment (e) also mentions “occasional, temporary
in-state services.”132 Thus, there is a tension between the black letter of
§ 3, which says nothing about temporary practice, and the comments to 
the section.
A. Comparing the Factors in the Comments to Model Rule 5.5 and 
Restatement § 3
While neither Model Rule 5.5(c)(4) nor Restatement § 3 provides a
list of factors to determine if the lawyer’s activities “arise out of or are
otherwise reasonably related” to a lawyer’s practice in the licensing
jurisdiction in its black letter provisions, the comments to each set forth
criteria that can be considered. The comparison of the factors in Model
Rule 5.5 Comment 14 and Restatement § 3 Comment (e)133 demonstrates 
their similarity, apart from Model Rule 5.5’s requirement that the work be
“temporary”:
lawyer could undertake work that required temporary activity in such a
jurisdiction.
Id. at 11. As can be seen from the black letter of Restatement § 3, however,
there is no requirement that the work be temporary.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e 
(AM. L. INST. 2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. There are five unnumbered factors in comment e. For comparison
purposes, the first and fifth factors have each been divided in two.
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lawyer’s client is a regular 
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have been previously 
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2) Whether a new client 
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there”
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the jurisdiction in which 
the lawyer is admitted”
3) “[W]hether a multistate
transaction has other 
significant connections 
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state”
“The matter, although 
involving other 
jurisdictions, may have a
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that jurisdiction [in which 
the lawyer is admitted]”
4) “[W]hether significant “[S]ignificant aspects of 
aspects of the lawyer’s the lawyer’s work might
activities are conducted in be conducted in that 
the lawyer’s home state” jurisdiction”
5) “[W]hether a
significant aspect of the
matter involves the law of 
the lawyer’s home state”
“[A] significant aspect of
the matter may involve the
law of that jurisdiction”
6) Whether “the activities 
of the client involve 
multiple jurisdictions”
“[T]he client’s activities or
the legal issues involve
multiple jurisdictions”
7) Whether “the legal “[T]he services may draw 
issues involved are on the lawyer’s recognized 
primarily either multistate expertise developed 
or federal in nature” through the regular
practice of law on behalf 
of clients in matters 
involving a particular body 
of federal, nationally-
uniform, foreign, or 
international law”
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722 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Transactional or telecommuting lawyers looking for clarity or
protection in their normal, everyday multijurisdictional practices can find
little solace in the “black letter” of either Model Rule 5.5 or Restatement
§ 3. Although the illustrations to this portion of the Restatement provide
what may be illusory salve, there appears to be a disconnect between the
“black letter” of the Restatement and the reality of lawyer conduct that the
authors of the Restatement envisioned the rule allowing because “they
arise out of or otherwise reasonably relate to the lawyer’s practice in a state
of admission.” 
B. Potentially Differing Results in the Restatement and Model Rules
under the Same Set of Facts
The differences in the approach to multijurisdictional practice
between the Restatement and the Model Rules become apparent when one
analyzes the factual situation set forth in Illustration 5 of Comment (e) to
Restatement § 3 to determine what the outcome would be under the Model
Rules as opposed to the Restatement. This Illustration involves an Illinois
lawyer whose client has moved to Florida and needs a codicil to a will the
lawyer drafted. Implicit in the illustration is that the lawyer prepares the
codicil in Illinois and travels to Florida only for the signing. While the
Illinois lawyer is in Florida having the codicil signed, the existing client
introduces the lawyer to another individual who wants the lawyer to
prepare a similar estate planning arrangement for her. The Restatement’s
Illustration concludes that it is permissible for the Illinois lawyer to assist
not only the existing client who has moved to Florida, but also the new
Florida-resident client whom the lawyer met while in Florida representing
the existing client. The Illustration notes that is acceptable if the lawyer
prepares the “similar estate arrangement” in Illinois, “frequently
conferring by telephone and letter” with the new client.134 Comparing and 
134. Id. § 3 cmt. e, illus. 5. The illustration reads, in full: 
5. Lawyer is admitted to practice and has an office in Illinois, where
Lawyer practices in the area of trusts and estates, an area involving,
among other things, both the law of wills, property, taxation, and trusts
of a particular state and federal income, estate, and gift tax law. Client A, 
whom Lawyer has represented in estate-planning matters, has recently
moved to Florida and calls Lawyer from there with a request that leads
to Lawyer’s preparation of a codicil to A’s will, which Lawyer takes to
Florida to obtain the necessary signatures. While there, A introduces
Lawyer to B, a friend of A, who, after learning of A’s estate-planning
arrangements from A, wishes Lawyer to prepare a similar estate
arrangement for B. Lawyer prepares the necessary documents and 
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7232021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
contrasting how the Restatement deals with Illustration 5 and how Model
Rule 5.5 would treat the same situation illustrates the ambiguities and
problems that emerge. 
First, consider the Illinois lawyer in Illustration 5 continuing to
provide estate planning services to the former Illinois resident who has
now moved to Florida. Under the Restatement’s approach, the Illinois
lawyer may continue to serve the existing client, even though the client
has moved to Florida and the estate plan will be governed by Florida,
rather than Illinois, law. One of the Restatement factors is met because the
Illinois lawyer, by serving the existing client in Florida, furthers the
client’s interest in preserving the client’s choice of counsel and, likely,
receiving efficiently provided service.135 Likewise, under Model Rule
5.5(c)(4), the lawyer’s work on the codicil is “reasonably related” to the
lawyer’s Illinois practice even though Florida law may control the codicil;
after all, Illinois is where the lawyer did the work for the client on the
original will and estate plan.
The Restatement’s Illustration takes the position that no unauthorized
practice occurs if the lawyer takes documents to Florida to obtain the
necessary signatures, and Model Rule 5.5(c)(4) may protect the lawyer in
this circumstance. Assuming that the lawyer is fully informed on Florida
law issues that pertain to the codicil, as well as the impact of Florida law
on an Illinois will, the comments to Model Rule 5.5 appear to provide a
shield for the Illinois lawyer because the attorney providing these limited
legal services is doing so on a temporary basis and in a fashion that does
“not create an unreasonable risk to the interest” of the client or the
public.136 
Additionally, another of the Restatement factors arguably is met
because Illustration 5 seems to imply that the lawyer does most of the work
in Illinois and only travels to Florida to obtain the client’s signature on the
codicil. On the other hand, although federal tax law may be involved,
which is a factor under the Restatement as well as under Comment 14 to
conducts legal research in Lawyer’s office in Illinois, frequently
conferring by telephone and letter with B in Florida. Lawyer then takes 
the documents to Florida for execution by B and necessary witnesses.
Lawyer’s activities in Florida on behalf of both A and B were 
permissible.
135. The word “efficiently” is used here rather than “less expensive”; we do
not offer an opinion or guess whether the Illinois lawyer’s fees would be more or
less than that charged by a Florida lawyer for the same result, but we do think it 
is highly likely that a new Florida lawyer would take some time evaluating A’s 
estate planning needs.
136. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 5.5 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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724 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Model Rule 5.5, this alone may not be enough to create a safe harbor, for
while federal law may have to be considered in the drafting of the codicil,
Illustration 5 does not specify that the client’s primary motive for the
codicil is tax planning.137 
The treatment of the new Florida client, however, is different under
the Restatement and Model Rule 5.5. In Illustration 5, the Illinois attorney
meets the new client in Florida, where the new client lives and where the 
lawyer is not admitted to practice. Although obtaining new clients is not
covered by the black letter of the Restatement, and while the Illustration
does not explicitly state whether the lawyer “sought” the new client in
Florida (or whether the new client, upon being introduced to the lawyer by
the existing client, then sought legal advice),138 the Restatement approves 
of the lawyer’s doing work for the new client and even traveling back to
Florida with the documents to be signed. The Illustration does not explain
why this is permitted, especially when the black letter of Restatement § 3 
is silent on this matter. In looking at the § 3 comments to try to ascertain
what factors might be a play, federal tax and estate law cannot be the
principal basis on which to decide the issue, for it is unclear whether such
law is the key motivating or determining factor here.139 Further, where the
137. For example, if the purpose of the codicil is merely to change a trustee or
add additional specific bequests, it is unlikely that federal tax and estate law would
play any role in advising the client or drafting the document.
138. The Illustration is not clear whether the Illinois lawyer has sought a new
client or whether a new client has sought the lawyer. Under the Illustration, it is
the existing client who introduces the new client to the lawyer. The point is that,
when the potential new client says something like, “You did such a great job for
my friend. I was wondering whether you’d do my estate plan,” the Illinois lawyer
has the clear choice of whether to engage in a conversation that might lead to an
attorney-client relationship or to respond that, while the lawyer is flattered, the
potential client could be served by one of the undoubtedly hundreds, or even
thousands, of Florida lawyers who do high-quality estate planning work and who
intimately know Florida law, thus permitting the lawyer to avoid worrying about 
potentially running afoul of unauthorized practice restrictions.
139. For example, see Nancy S. Freeman, Brave New World: New Challenges
in Florida Trusts and Estates Practice, in STRATEGIES FOR TRUSTS AND ESTATES
IN FLORIDA: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
NAVIGATING THE ESTATE PLANNING PROCESS IN FLORIDA 1, 2 (2013 ed.), 2013
WL 9715, which notes that Florida’s Power of Attorney Act has significant
changes from the Uniform Power of Attorney Act and that there are traps for the
unwary under the Florida Trust Code. Moreover, see Eric Gurgold, Practicing
Trusts and Estate Law in Florida: A Unique Experience, in STRATEGIES FOR
TRUSTS AND ESTATES IN FLORIDA, LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT
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7252021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Illinois lawyer physically sits while working on the new client’s estate plan
appears to be irrelevant. Why is it any more permissible for an Illinois
lawyer to represent a new Florida client on a one-time basis because the
lawyer’s seat is warming a chair in Marion rather than Miami? Moreover,
what if the Illinois lawyer has picked up a new client on the first trip to
Florida, and, on the second trip back to Florida to have the estate plan for
the new client signed, is introduced to clients three, four, and five, and then
does work for each and travels from Illinois for each to have the documents
signed? Nothing in the Restatement or its Comment (e) appears to prohibit
this, and the scattered statements elsewhere in the Comment about
“temporary” services are never expressly considered in Illustration 5. 
The Restatement’s commentary does attempt to bring its goal back to
client needs by pointing out that a rule requiring an out-of-state lawyer to
work with local counsel likely causes the client to bear the added expense
of retaining and educating the local counsel. It concludes that this “would
make such required retention unduly burdensome.”140 This observation, of
course, has everything to do with the lawyer in Illustration 5 continuing to
provide estate planning services to the first client, who has moved from
Illinois to Florida. On the other hand, it seems to have little relevance to
the lawyer providing estate planning services for the new Florida client
who neither had any previous tie to the Illinois lawyer nor even knew of
that lawyer’s existence. 
Applying Model Rule 5.5 to the facts of this Illustration appears to
lead to a different result when one considers the issue of the new Florida
client. It is clear that when the lawyer meets with the new client in Florida
and discusses estate planning, the lawyer is practicing law in a state where
the lawyer is not licensed. Comment 2 to Model Rule 5.5 notes that the
“definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one
jurisdiction to another.” Florida did not adopt Model Rule 5.5 verbatim,
and the language of Florida’s version of Model Rule 5.5(c)(4) differs from
DEVELOPMENTS AND NAVIGATING THE ESTATE PLANNING PROCESS IN FLORIDA
1, 4 (2014 ed.), Westlaw 1234520, noting:
Florida’s homestead laws give the estate planning practitioner another
unique area of practice. If a client owns his or her principal residence in
his or her own name and is a Florida resident, the principal residence will 
most likely be his or her homestead. The Florida Constitution and the
Florida Statutes restrict how a homestead could be devised and define
how it is devised if the homestead is not devised as authorized by the
constitution. It often comes as a surprise to the client that they are not 
free to dispose of their homestead in any manner that they wish.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. e 
(2000).
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  54 4/26/21  8:53 AM




   
 
 









   
  
  
    






     
 
   
  
   
 
 
         
     





     
726 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the Model Rule.141 Moreover, in a case strikingly similar to the facts in
Restatement Illustration 5, the Florida Supreme Court held that a retired
Illinois lawyer who prepared a will for a Florida resident was engaged in
the unlawful practice of law.142 But, even under Model Rule 5.5, none of
the seven factors in Model Rule 5.5 Comment 14 are present here, and one 
may would be hard pressed to say that the Illinois lawyer’s activities on
behalf of the new Florida client would not violate Model Rule 5.5’s
prohibitions. 
VII. FOUR HYPOTHETICALS ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS WITH MODEL
RULE 5.5
As can be seen, a transactional lawyer who relies on the Restatement
to service new clients in a state where the lawyer is not licensed may find
that disciplinary authorities enforcing Model Rule 5.5 may not agree with
the result of Restatement Illustration 5 or even find it persuasive authority.
The fact situation of Restatement § 3, Illustration 5 is not the only one
transactional lawyers face, and the results (as noted above) may differ
depending on whether one applies the analysis of the Restatement’s
Illustration or the Model Rule and its comments. Leaving aside the
Restatement, however, the following hypotheticals, which reflect the real
world of transactional and telecommuting lawyers, illustrate additional
problems with the current language of Model Rule 5.5.
141. A redline of Florida’s Rule 4–5.5(c)(4), showing how it differs from the
Model Rule, follows:
(4) are not within subdivisions (c)(2) or (c)(3), and
(A) are performed for a client who resides in or has an office in the 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice, or
(B) arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. (emphasis
added)
Compare R. REG. FLA. BAR 4–5.5(c)(4) (2002), with MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT. r. 5.5(c)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
142. Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 298 So. 2d 371, 372–73 (Fla. 1974). The facts in
Larkin go beyond those in the Restatement, however, in that Larkin had become
a resident of Florida at the time he wrote the will, as well as an antenuptial 
agreement, and that he had “received no direct compensation” for his activities.
The Court did not sanction Larkin because he had cooperated, admitted his acts,
and promised not to do it again. Id. at 373.
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7272021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
A. The Nationally Known Lawyer, Part 1
Hypothetical #1. Eleanor Expert is a nationally known practitioner and
one of the country’s leading attorneys in negotiating and drafting
commercial leases in shopping centers. Eleanor handles matters involving
shopping center leasing all over the country.
Eleanor is licensed only in State A. Eleanor, however, has done
numerous deals in states B, C, and D, all initially with the assistance of
local counsel. None of this work is either systematic or continuous.
As time goes by and Eleanor handles more and more deals in these
states, but not systematically or continuously, she finds that she has
acquired and researched the applicable laws of those states and knows
them as well as, if not better than, local counsel.
Three new deals come in, one from New Client B in State B, one from
New Client C in State C, and one in New Client D in State D. While certain
aspects of federal law are triggered in each of these matters, each primarily
involves state law and contractual rights.
The new clients do not have offices in State A, where Eleanor has her
office. Each of these matters is unique to each state. Each client wants 
Eleanor to handle the drafting of each commercial lease. They want her to
travel out of state from her home office to handle each deal. All the
negotiations about the leases and related documents will take place in
states where Eleanor is not licensed. Each client wants to keep costs down
and does not want “local” counsel involved other than as minimally
necessary, such as for the recordation of the lease or extract of the lease.
Under Model Rule 5.5, Eleanor cannot handle these matters under
5.5(c)(3)’s exception for matters that “are reasonably related to the 
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice,” because none of these matters are related to Eleanor’s practice
in State A. 
It might be argued that as long as Eleanor handles these matters in
States B, C, and D from her office in State A, she is doing something
related to her practice in State A, because the clients from out of state
sought assistance from her by contacting her in the State A in light of her
expertise. This argument, however, may not protect Eleanor when she 
travels to States B, C, and D to do the negotiations, because these are new
clients, and nothing about these matters concerns State A or “arise[s] out
of or [is] reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is admitted to practice.” Eleanor’s expertise has resulted
from her nationwide work, not her limited work in State A. Further, as
Birbrower and its progeny show, simply doing work from your “home”
office may not be a sufficient defense to a charge of engaging in the
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728 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
practice of law in another state.143 It may be hard to argue that Eleanor is 
not practicing law in these other states when she is there at the clients’
requests, handling negotiations, and billing the appropriate client for her
activities.
Likewise, Model Rule 5.5(c)(1)’s exception involving work
“undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in
this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter” does not
protect Eleanor in these circumstances, for the local counsel’s work in
handling recording likely does not meet the “active” participation test. 
Model Rule 5.5’s requirements that Eleanor must satisfy to avoid
having her activities labeled as “unauthorized practice” actually work
against the client’s interest, for the only way that Eleanor can comply with 
Model Rule 5.5 is to get local counsel more deeply involved in the matter,
even though neither she nor the client needs that active involvement.
Adding more involvement by local counsel merely adds costs to the
transaction without aiding the client; all it does is protect Eleanor’s license
under the current Model Rules. 
The arguments advanced in favor of having a local lawyer’s
involvement are usually twofold. The first is that it is important to
disciplinary authorities in a state to be aware when an out-of-state lawyer
is rendering legal services in the local area. This assertion, however,
cannot withstand scrutiny, for even when a litigator obtains a court’s
issuance of a pro hac vice order, there is no necessary notice to disciplinary
authorities. Having a local lawyer involved on a non-litigation transaction
does not provide any notice to disciplinary authorities. Moreover, under
Model Rule 8.5, a lawyer is subject to jurisdiction where the practice of
law occurs, regardless of whether disciplinary authorities have been given 
advance notice that the lawyer is present in the jurisdiction.144
143. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Ct., 949
P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1998). As Birbrower stated: 
[O]ne may practice law in the state in violation of section 6125 although
not physically present here by advising a California client on California
law in connection with a California legal dispute by telephone, fax,
computer, or other modern technological means. Conversely, although
we decline to provide a comprehensive list of what activities constitute
sufficient contact with the state, we do reject the notion that a person
automatically practices law “in California” whenever that person
practices California law anywhere, or “virtually” enters the state by
telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite.
Id. at 5–6.
144. Model Rules of Professional Conduct rule 8.5(a) provides:
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The second argument is that a local lawyer’s involvement assures
competency; however, as many commentators have noted for decades,
neither competency nor expertise in a particular area of the law is
inextricably linked with passing a state’s bar exam as a prerequisite for
obtaining a local license.145 Moreover, 34 states, the District of Columbia, 
and the Virgin Islands now utilize the Uniform Bar Examination, which
by its definition does not include consideration of local laws.146 
As this Hypothetical #1 illustrates, requiring in-state lawyer
involvement does not increase client protection but only increases client
costs. A client who desires to hire an out-of-state lawyer should not be
required to also engage a local lawyer to “actively participate” in the
matter, as mandated by Model Rule 5.5(c)(1), as long as the out-of-state 
lawyer’s usual and customary practice makes that person the best and most
cost-effective attorney to handle the transaction. Of course, in such
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted
in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services 
in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority
of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
145. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 84; see also James W. Jones et al.,
Reforming Lawyer Mobility – Protecting Turf or Serving Clients, 30 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 125, 142 (2017) (“Moreover, in an age of increasing lawyer
specialization, it is clearly true that lawyers trained and experienced in particular
substantive areas of the law are likely to be more competent to handle matters in
their fields of specialization, even in states where they are not licensed, than are
non-specialist lawyers physically located in such states. An experienced real 
estate lawyer from New York, for example, is more likely to be able competently
to handle a complex real estate financing project in Chicago than a family law 
practitioner who happens to be licensed in Illinois.”); Wolfram, supra note 83, at
678 (“[It] is preposterous to think that when one of the gurus of the mergers and
acquisitions bar, Joseph Flom or Martin Lipton, emerges from an airplane in a
jurisdiction far from New York City that they modestly submit themselves to the 
“supervision” of whatever locally-admitted lawyer their firms hypothetically
might have engaged in an effort to comply with local restrictions on unauthorized
practice. Nor is it evident why even mere journey-person lawyers should learn to
heel to a local lawyer’s obedience school supervision.”).
146. See infra Section IX.A for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
Information on the Uniform Bar Examination can be found on the website of the
National Conference of Bar Examiners. NCBE, http://www.ncbex.org/exams
/ube/ [https://perma.cc/F5DT-TGXR] (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
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730 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
instances, the attorney may need to make the client aware that the lawyer
of the client’s choosing is not licensed in that state. 
B. The Nationally Known Lawyer, Part 2
Hypothetical #2. The facts are the same as in Hypothetical #1, except
that the new clients contact Eleanor during a commercial leasing 
convention being held in State X, a state where Eleanor is not licensed to
practice and where none of the new clients has any business. 
While in State X, Eleanor clears conflicts with her office, generates
engagement agreements on her laptop, has each of the new clients sign, 
and then has private meetings with each of the clients during the
convention. At these private meetings, she gives each client legal advice
on how to proceed in each of their states. She keeps track of her time and
bills the clients for the time spent giving them advice in State X.
Under Model Rule 5.5, Eleanor has an additional problem. By having
the new clients sign engagement agreements in State X and giving advice
to each while she is in State X, Eleanor is clearly practicing law in State
X. The fact that she bills them for this time only confirms that she is
practicing law in State X. Furthermore, all the problems noted in
Hypothetical #1 still exist.
C. The Nationally Known Lawyer, Part 3
Hypothetical #3. The facts are the same as in Hypothetical #1, but
now, Eleanor, in order to avoid problems with States A, B, and C, contacts
a recently licensed law school graduate in each state. Each of these lawyers
maintains a solo practice and none of them has anywhere near Eleanor’s
experience. 
Eleanor tells each of these recently licensed lawyers, “I’d like for you
to actively participate in this matter in your state. I’ll pass all the
documents by you to see if you have any comments or suggestions, and
I’ll arrange with my client to directly engage you for such purposes.”
Each newly licensed lawyer readily agrees.
Eleanor has now complied with the express requirements of Model
Rule 5.5(c)(1), because her work in each of the three states in which she is
not licensed is “undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted
to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter.”
Yet, one might ask who is being protected by this. Certainly not the client;
the client only gets increased costs.147 
147. It is, of course, possible that one of the recently licensed law school 
graduates might catch something Eleanor missed, but it is unlikely any client will 
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Moreover, while one might argue that implicit in Model Rule 5.5 is a
requirement that the local lawyer be competent, nothing in Hypothetical
#3 suggests that newly licensed lawyers cannot be competent. All Model
Rule 1.1 requires for competence is “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness,
and preparation.” Moreover, Comment (1) to Model Rule 1.1 indicates that
it is appropriate to “associate or consult with a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question.” Eleanor is the attorney with the
established competence.148 Therefore, nothing prohibits Eleanor’s actions
here.
If “competence” is not state-specific—and it is not, because both the
bar-admission-by-motion and the pro hac vice rules essentially
acknowledge that lawyers not licensed in a state are perfectly competent
to handle matters in states where they did not take the bar examination149— 
then requiring local lawyers on multistate transactions cannot be justified
as a client protection tool.150 
be willing to pay for an additional lawyer’s review on the possibility that the
expert lawyer might miss something.
148. As noted by William T. Barker in Extrajurisdictional Practice by 
Lawyers, often “the out-of-state lawyer is the real expert or, at least, the lawyer to
whom the client primarily looks.” 56 BUS. LAW. 1501, 1508 (2001).
149. See Jones et al., supra note 145, at 142–43 (“In the United States today,
forty-one states and the District of Columbia permit the admission of out-of-state
lawyers to practice in their jurisdictions on motion and without the requirement
that they pass the local bar examination under some circumstances. This fact in
itself underscores the point that lawyers in all U.S. jurisdictions are competent
professionals who need not demonstrate specialized knowledge about the
substantive law or procedures of a particular state in order to practice there in a 
way that serves the best interests of their clients. The same point is confirmed in
practices across the country relating to pro hac vice admission of out-of-state
litigators.”). See also Anthony E. Davis, Multijurisdictional Practice by
Transactional Lawyers – Why the Sky Is Really Falling, 11 PROF. LAW. 1, 24 
(2000), in which Davis relates the tribulations of his trying to be admitted by
motion to practice in Colorado after having practiced law for 20 years in New
York, being a barrister in the United Kingdom, and having received his law 
degrees from Oxford University, which boasts the oldest continuous law faculty
in the English speaking world. Davis’ application was rejected ostensibly because
he did not graduate from an “accredited law school.”
150. For a strongly worded view of the local barriers erected to
multijurisdictional practice, see Davis, supra note 149, at 25:
In short, the states’ efforts to justify maintaining local regulation of
lawyers in order to protect the public are, in today’s economy, so
obviously irrelevant to meaningful enforcement of national standards
that they no longer even serve as a credible mask for their true purpose,
namely the preservation of local monopoly. I am not advocating the
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732 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
D. The Lawyer Telecommuting from Her Out-of-State Residence
Hypothetical #4. Tammy Tech, a technologically adept lawyer, is
employed by a firm whose offices are in State A. Tammy is licensed in
State A but lives in State B where she is not licensed. Tammy does not
want to move to State A and is happy to work from her home, State B. She
has set up her computer so that it appears just as it would if she were in the
office in State A. She does not advertise in State B, does not solicit clients 
in State B. She only performs the kind of work that she would do if she
were in the office in State A, and her work involves the law of only State
A and of federal law. 
Even though Tammy’s work would be perfectly permissible if she
both lived and worked in State A, where she is licensed, the “black letter”
text of Model Rule 5.5 would appear to prohibit her from telecommuting.
She lives in State B, so she has a “systematic and continuous presence”151 
in State B, and she is practicing law while living full time in State B;
therefore, her work in State B is not “temporary.”152 
The issue of telecommuting is one that was not envisioned when the
current version of Model Rule 5.5 was adopted, and some courts have
struggled on how to interpret it. For example, in a situation similar to
Tammy’s, in In Re Jones153 the Ohio Supreme Court dealt with a 
Kentucky-licensed lawyer whose Kentucky-based firm merged with an
Ohio-based firm. After the merger, Ms. Jones applied to be admitted in
Ohio but, before her application was acted on, she both transferred to the
merged firm’s Cincinnati office and became domiciled in Ohio. She
continued to practice Kentucky law from her Cincinnati office and while
living in Ohio. The Ohio Board of Commissioners on Character and
Fitness considered the issue and found that Jones was engaged in the
“unauthorized practice of law”154 because it did “not believe that her
abolition of regulation in favor of some purely capitalistic caveat emptor
principle; rather, I suggest that what is needed - urgently - is a new
regulatory and enforcement structure that bears a real relationship to
national and global law practice. The emperor’s old clothes have fallen
apart, and instead of trying to mend them we must consider whether we 
need to replace the emperor.
151. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
152. Id. r. 5.5(c).
153. In re Jones, 123 N.E.3d 877 (Ohio 2018).
154. Id. at 878.
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7332021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
practice of law has been temporary as contemplated by”155 Ohio’s version
of Model Rule 5.5(c).156 
The four-justice majority of the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and
found no violation of Rule 5.5, but only because the attorney had applied
for admission first and then moved to the state.157 Had she not applied for
155. Id.
156. The text of Ohio’s Rule 5.5(c), redlined against the Model Rule, follows:
(c) A lawyer who is admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and
not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, is in good 
standing in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted, and
regularly practices law may provide legal services on a temporary basis
in this jurisdiction that if one or more of the following apply:
(1) the services are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates
in the matter;
(2) are in or the services are reasonably related to a pending or
potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction,
if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by
law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to
be so authorized;
(3) are in or the services are reasonably related to a pending or
potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute
resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services 
arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not
services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission;
(4) are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c) (3) and the lawyer
engages in negotiations, investigations, or other nonlitigation
activities that arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s
practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
OHIO PROF. COND. R. 5.5(c) (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio
.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdf [https://perma.c
c/J948-2R JU] (emphasis added).
157. Jones, 123 N.E.3d at 881:
A lawyer who applies for admission without examination to the Ohio bar
in accordance with Gov.Bar R. I(9) and thereafter provides legal services 
from Ohio in the jurisdiction where that applicant is already admitted to
practice law pending the resolution of that application is providing
services on a temporary basis because those services are transitory and
will continue only until the application is resolved.
Here, the record establishes that Jones satisfied the requirements of
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c)(2). She is a lawyer who is admitted in Kentucky, is
in good standing in that jurisdiction, regularly practices law, and is
providing legal services from an office in Ohio, and those services are
reasonably related to pending or potential proceedings before tribunals 
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admission prior to moving to the state, the result would have been
different, for the Jones court distinguished Ms. Jones’s situation from a
similar case involving another Kentucky lawyer who moved to Ohio and
practiced Kentucky law while in Ohio but who waited years before
applying to the Ohio Bar for admission without examination.158 
A concurring justice in Jones, joined by two other justices, stated that
he reached the same result, but on different grounds. He would have found
that, under the express text of Ohio Rule 5.5(c), Ms. Jones’s practice was
not temporary, but that the rule itself was unconstitutional under both the
federal and state constitutions, stating that “Ohio does not have any
legitimate government interest in regulating an attorney who does not
practice in Ohio courts or provide Ohio legal services.”159 
In contrast to the result in Jones, an “informal ethics opinion” by the
Missouri Bar concluded that an Illinois-licensed attorney could not
practice Illinois law from an office in Missouri while attempting to become
licensed in Missouri.160 
in Kentucky, where she is authorized by law to appear in such
proceedings. Although Jones began practicing Kentucky law from Ohio
more than two years ago, after she had applied for admission prior to
moving to Ohio, her practice from Ohio pending her application is
temporary because the continuation of her practice depends on the
resolution of her application.
158. The case that Jones distinguished was In re Egan, 90 N.E.3d 912 (Ohio
2017).
159. Jones, 123 N.E.3d at 885. The concurring opinion also stated:
I would conclude that as applied to an out-of-state attorney who is not
practicing in Ohio courts or providing Ohio legal services, Prof.Cond.R.
5.5(b)(1) violates Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As applied to such an attorney, the rule violates Article I,
Section 1 both because it does not “bear[ ] a real and substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” and because it is
“arbitrary” and “unreasonable,” Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 524, 728 
N.E.2d 342. Similarly, applying the rule to such an attorney violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it does not bear a rational relationship
to any discernable state interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 728, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 
563 (1955).
Id. at 886–87 (DeWine, J., concurring).
160. See Opinion Number: 20030078 – Rule Number 4-5.5, available at
http://www.mobar.org/mobarforms/opinionResult.aspx?OpinionNumber=20030 
078 [https://perma.cc/85XQ-GQR6] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019), which states in
full:
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7352021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
In December 2020, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility released Formal Opinion 495 on “lawyers
working remotely.”161 The opinion states that lawyers “may remotely
practice the law of the jurisdictions in which they are licensed while
physically present in a jurisdiction in which they are not admitted” as long
as four conditions are met: (i) “the local jurisdiction has not determined
that the conduct is the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law,” (ii)
they do not hold themselves out as being licensed to practice in the local
jurisdiction,” (iii) they “do not advertise or otherwise hold out as having
an office in the local jurisdiction,” and (iv) they “do not provide or offer
to provide legal services in the local jurisdiction.”162 
While the opinion provides solace to many lawyers who telecommute,
the fact remains that the black letter provisions of Model Rule 5.5(b)(1)
seem to prohibit a lawyer from having a “systematic and continuous
presence” in the jurisdiction for the practice of law without being licensed
in that jurisdiction. 
QUESTION: Attorney is licensed in Illinois and attempting to become
licensed in Missouri. Attorney’s office is located in Missouri. (1) Can
Attorney practice Illinois law from the office in Missouri? (2) Can 
Attorney conduct any business for the Illinois practice from the Missouri 
office? If so, what activities can be performed from the Missouri office?
(3) Can Attorney be included on Missouri office letterhead indicating
attorney is licensed in Illinois only? (4) Can Attorney perform the
functions of a paralegal or any other work with respect to cases pending
in Missouri?
ANSWER: Questions 1. and 4. No, Attorney may not engage in conduct
that constitutes the practice of law, while physically located in Missouri.
However, Attorney may function as a law clerk or paralegal, as long as
Attorney is not held out as an attorney in connection with those 
functions.
Question 2. Yes, Attorney may conduct business for the Illinois practice
from the Missouri office, as long as Attorney’s conduct does not
constitute the practice of law and Attorney does not state or imply that
Attorney is licensed in Missouri.
Question 3. Yes.
Attorney could practice law in Missouri while waiting to take the Bar
exam if Attorney obtains a temporary license under Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 8.115.
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736 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
To return to the facts of Hypothetical #4, under both Ohio’s Jones
decision and the Missouri ethics opinion, the lawyer in the hypothetical,
Tammy Tech, could lose her license because, although none of her work
involves the laws of State B where she resides, she has not applied to be
admitted to practice in that state. Tammy may seek to rely on Formal
Opinion 495, but individual states may choose to accept or reject the
rationale of an ABA Formal Opinion.163 All of this leads one to wonder, 
in the words of one commentator, what the justification is for a rule
“prohibiting that attorney from providing legal advice to individuals in the
jurisdiction where he is not admitted about the law where he is admitted,
or even counseling individuals about the law in a jurisdiction where he is
not admitted, provided that proper disclosures are made about the
attorney’s qualifications.”164 
Ethics opinions issued by Utah165 and Florida166 take a different
position than Ohio and Missouri. Under the Utah opinion, if Tammy
permanently resides in Utah, she is exempt from the unauthorized practice
restrictions if she does not open an office in Utah and does not hold herself
out as practicing Utah law.167 
163. See, for example, In re Rule Amendments to Rules 5.4(a) & 7.2(c) of the
Rules of Pro. Conduct, 815 A.2d 47, 52 (R.I. 2002), which held that the Rhode
Island’s “Ethics Advisory Panel’s Advisory Opinion No. 2000–5 did not err in
refusing to adopt ABA Formal Opinion 93–374 as controlling, and instead opted
to consider as controlling our state statute, our Court rules, and our promulgated
opinions.” See also Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors, Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1098 (Cal.
2007) (stating that “an ‘ABA formal opinion does not establish an obligatory
standard of conduct imposed on California lawyers’”).
164. Michael E. Rosman, Is It Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of
Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules?, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 74, 79 (2019).
165. UTAH STATE BAR, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION NO. 19-03 (May 14,
2019), https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/19-03.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J3GU-345U] [hereinafter UTAH OPINION].
166. THE FLORIDA BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE UNLICENSED
PRACTICE OF LAW, PROPOSED ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2019-4 (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2020/07/Complete-FAO-2019-4-Opi 
nion-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4T5-RE8Z] [hereinafter FLORIDA OPINION].
167. See UTAH OPINION, supra note 165. The Utah Opinion states the issue as:
If an individual licensed as an active attorney in another state and in good
standing in that state establishes a home in Utah and practices law for
clients from the state where the attorney is licensed, neither soliciting
Utah clients nor establishing a public office in Utah, does the attorney
violate the ethical prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law?
Id. at 1. In reaching its position that the answer is “no,” the Utah opinion cites the
concurrence in In re Jones:
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7372021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
The attorney sought the Florida opinion who had limited his practice
to federal intellectual property law and was admitted in New York, in New
Jersey, and before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.168 In
reaching its conclusion that the unauthorized practice of law rules did not
bar his living in Florida and continuing his normal practice, the opinion
shows that that the subject matter of the practice appeared to be irrelevant
as long as neither Florida law nor Florida clients were involved.169 
If Tammy Tech were residing in Utah or Florida, her license to
practice law would be safe, but the telecommuting hypothetical need not
be limited to those attorneys residing permanently in a state where they 
are not licensed. There are lawyers who take extended vacations out of
state and work from the road. There are those who have vacation homes
where they spend weeks or months at a time. In both instances, the
distinction that Model Rule 5.5 creates between practicing law on visits
that are “temporary” versus those that are “systematic and continuous”
may create a trap for the unwary, unless a state accepts the reasoning and
result of ABA Formal Opinion 495.
VIII. MODEL RULE 5.5’S MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 
RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERCUT BY THE UNIFORM BAR EXAM, BY 
ADMISSION-WITHOUT-EXAMINATION RULES, BY RECIPROCITY RULES,
AND BY THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY IN CLE REQUIREMENTS
Given the structure of Model Rule 5.5 and its distinction between
practices that are “systematic and continuous” as opposed to “temporary,”
it is strained, to say the least, to contend that the purpose of the
multijurisdictional-practice restriction and its exceptions arise from the
The question posed here is just as clear as the question before the Ohio
Supreme Court: what interest does the Utah State Bar have in regulating
an out-of-state lawyer’s practice for out-of-state clients simply because 
he has a private home in Utah? And the answer is the same—none.
Id. at 6–7 (citing In re Jones, 123 N.E.3d 877 (Ohio 2018)).
168. See FLORIDA OPINION, supra note 166, at 2–3.
169. Id. at 5–6.
It is clear from the facts in Petitioner’s request and his testimony at the
public hearing that Petitioner and his law firm will not be establishing a 
law office in Florida. It is equally clear that Petitioner will not be 
establishing a regular presence in Florida for the practice of law; he will 
merely be living here.
The facts raised in Petitioner’s request, quite simply, do not implicate the 
unlicensed practice of law in Florida. Petitioner is not practicing Florida
law or providing legal services for Florida residents. Nor is he or his law
firm holding out to the public as having a Florida presence.
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738 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
supposed uniqueness of the law of a particular state. If a practice is
“temporary” within the scope of Model Rule 5.5(c), then it matters not if
the legal issues arise from the peculiar laws of the state or from regulations
or ordinances in the county where the issue arose. If the practice is
“temporary” and otherwise fits the requirements of Model Rule 5.5(c), the
out-of-state lawyer’s handling of a matter in that state is permitted. 
What then is left as the purpose of Model Rule 5.5’s distinction
between practices that are “systematic and continuous” as opposed to
“temporary”? It cannot be to permit state bar or other officials to discipline
out-of-state lawyers. That right already exists under Model Rule 8.5.170 It
cannot be for the protection of the public, for clients have the right to sue
any lawyer for malpractice if they do not demonstrate competence, which
170. The text of Model Rule 8.5(a) is quoted in full at supra note 144.
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courts test by local norms171—the “locality” rule172—and to file 
complaints with their state’s disciplinary authorities. The only rationale
171. See Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), disapproved
on other grounds, Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989) (a legal
malpractice case where an expert legal witness from one county was held
unqualified to testify against an attorney whose alleged malpractice occurred in a 
different county). The origin of the locality rule is described in Russo v. Griffin,
510 A.2d 436, 437–39 (Vt. 1986), where the court determined that a state-wide
locality rule, and not county-wide rule, is the correct criterion for legal
malpractice claims:
The locality rule is an exclusive product of the United States. See Shilkret
v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association, 276 Md. 187, 193, 349
A.2d 245, 248 (1975). It was first applied to the medical profession
approximately a century ago when there existed a great disparity
between standards of practice in large urban centers and remote rural
areas. Id. at 193, 349 A.2d at 249. “The rule was unquestionably
developed to protect the rural and small town practitioner, who was
presumed to be less adequately informed and equipped than his big city
brother.” Id. at 193, 349 A.2d at 248.
The shortcomings of the locality rule are well recognized. It immunizes 
persons who are sole practitioners in their community from malpractice 
liability and it promotes a “conspiracy of silence” in the plaintiffs’
locality which, in many cases, effectively precludes plaintiffs from
retaining qualified experts to testify on their behalf. Id. at 193–94, 349 
A.2d at 249 (citing Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule 
In Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 De Paul L. Rev. 408, 411 (1969);
Note, Medical Malpractice—Michigan Abandons “Locality Rule” with
Regard to Specialists, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 435, 438 (1971)). Recent 
developments in technology and the trend toward standardization have
further undermined support for the rule. See Shilkret, supra, 276 Md. at
197, 349 A.2d at 250.
***
In selecting a territorial limitation on the standard of care, we believe that
the most logical is that of the state. See Mallen & Levit, supra, at 336;
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A comment g (1965)
(allowance for variations in type of community or degree of skill and
knowledge possessed by practitioners therein has seldom been made in
legal profession as such variations either do not exist or are not worthy
of recognition). In Vermont, the rules governing the practice of law do
not vary from community to community but are the same throughout the
state. Moreover, in order to practice law in Vermont attorneys must
successfully complete the requirements for admission established by this
Court and administered by the Vermont Board of Bar Examiners. Among 
these prerequisites is the requirement that all candidates for admission
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740 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
left is the one that Professor Llellwyn complained of almost 90 years ago
and Professor Wolfram complained of almost two decades ago:173 
protection of “local” lawyers and the reduction or elimination of
competition for their business. 
But even if there are lingering arguments that some “local” laws are
unique and require state-trained practitioners, this argument is undercut by
the Uniform Bar Exam, by the admission-without-examination rules, by
reciprocity rules, and by the lack of specificity in state mandatory
continuing legal education requirements. 
complete a study of law in the office of a judge or practicing attorney in
this state.
The relevant geographic area then is not the community in which the
attorney’s office is located or the nation as a whole, but the jurisdiction
in which the attorney is licensed to practice. Accordingly, we hold that
the appropriate standard of care to which a lawyer is held in the
performance of professional services is “that degree of care, skill,
diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a 
reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this
jurisdiction.” Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash.2d 393, 395,
438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968); see also Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 254 So.2d 79, 82 (La.App.1971) (attorney liable for
failure to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which is
commonly possessed and exercised by practicing attorneys in his or her
jurisdiction); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146
(1954) (attorney not liable for following service of process custom which
had prevailed in state for two decades and was followed generally by
attorneys throughout the state); Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225
(N.D.1971) (attorney liable for failure “to exercise that degree of care
commonly possessed and exercised by other reasonable, careful and
prudent lawyers of this State”).
Id.
172. For more on the locality rule, see Anna M. Limoges, Lost in the Locality 
Labyrinth: A Search for the Appropriate Legal Malpractice Standard Set Forth
in Hamilton v. Sommers, 61 S.D. L. REV. 108 (2016); E. Lee Schlender,
Malpractice and the Idaho Locality Rule: Stuck in the Nineteenth Century, 44
IDAHO L. REV. 361 (2008); Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Expert Testimony in Legal
Malpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727 (1994); Dwain E. Fagerlund, Legal
Malpractice: The Locality Rule and Other Limitations of the Standard of Care:
Should Rural and Metropolitan Lawyers Be Held to the Same Standard of Care?, 
64 N.D. L. REV. 661 (1988).
173. See Llewellyn, supra note 84; see also Wolfram, supra note 83.
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A. The Uniform Bar Examination Does Not Test on “Local” Law
The Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) does not test on state law: “The
UBE is designed to test knowledge and skills that every lawyer should be
able to demonstrate prior to becoming licensed to practice law. It results
in a portable score that can be used to apply for admission in other UBE
jurisdictions.”174 Of the 34 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin 
Islands utilizing the UBE, 20 states and the District of Columbia do not
require an applicant for admission to have to reviewed or be tested in any 
way on that jurisdiction’s law.175 Four states require an applicant who
passes the UBE to take in-person or online classes on state law,176 and 10
states and the Virgin Islands require an applicant who passes the UBE to
review online materials on state law and then either to correctly answer
174. Uniform Bar Examination, NCBE, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/
[https://perma.cc/JG9K-5XHK] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
175. The 20 states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See id.
176. See Admissions Requirements: Exam Applicants, ALABAMA STATE BAR
ADMISSIONS OFFICE, https://admissions.alabar.org/admission-requirements-
exam-applicants?keyword=online [https://perma.cc/4BFU-4U9Y] (last visited
Apr. 27, 2020); Montana Bar Exam Information, AMERIBAR, https://ameri
bar.com/montana-bar-exam/ [https://perma.cc/L6HT-MWMB] (last visited Apr.
27, 2020); Required Class in NM Law, NEW MEXICO BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 
https://nmexam.org/events/category/required-class-in-nm-law/list/ [https://perma 
.cc/R4UN-79GQ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2020); Tennessee Law Course, 
TENNESSEE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, https://www.tnble.org/?page_id=57
[https://perma.cc/JXL7-2RTH] (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
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742 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
hurdle questions to move from one subject to another177 or to pass an open-
book, multiple-choice test based on the materials.178 
If a state admits bar applicants based solely on passing the UBE, it
becomes difficult to assert that limitations on multijurisdictional practice
are to protect the public from lawyers who are unfamiliar with that state’s
law. Use of the UBE means that the state is relying on the competency
requirement of Model Rule 1.1,179 which requires any lawyer, wherever
admitted, to be competent in representing a client.
B. Neither Admission-without-Examination nor Reciprocity Rules Deal
with a “Non-Local” Lawyer’s Knowledge of “Local” Law
Many states, even some that do not solely rely on the UBE for bar
admission, allow some form of admission to practice without having to
177. See Arizona Law Course Online Registration, AZCOURTS.GOV, https: 
//www.azcourts.gov/educationservices/Committees/JCA/Online-Registration
[https://perma.cc/VJ8B-FSBL] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020); Welcome to the New 
York Law Course, NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, https:// 
www.newyorklawcourse.org/ [https://perma.cc/PMM3-WK3W] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020); Course Instructions, BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF THE STATE
OF NORTH CAROLINA, https://www.ncble.org/nc-state-specific-component-
course-instructions [https://perma.cc/DX3E-PGPE] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020);
Candidate Course of Study, SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, https://www.scbar.org/shop-
cle/cos/ [https://perma.cc/2PY9-UGSF] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020); Texas Law
Course, TEXAS BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, https://ble.texas.gov/faq.action#783
[https://perma.cc/8EJD-46B8] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
178. See Maryland Law Component, MARYLAND COURTS, https://www.md
courts.gov/ble/mdlawcomponent [https://perma.cc/ERQ5-G8PZ] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020); The Massachusetts Law Component (MLC), MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/how-to/the-massachusetts-law-component-mlc 
[https://perma.cc/9YZW-8BY7] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020); Missouri
Educational Component, MBLE, https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=325
[https://perma.cc/GW2P-HGXW] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020); Uniform Bar Exam
Frequently Asked Questions, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE OHIO 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/admissions/
UBE/faq.asp [https://perma.cc/AD4Y-BKW4] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020);
Washington Law Component, WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, https: 
//www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/join-the-legal-profession-in-wa/washing
ton-law-component [https://perma.cc/7SXX-AVT5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020);
Virgin Islands Law Component, SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, http://
visupremecourt.hosted.civiclive.com/offices_of_the_court/bar_admission/regula 
r_admissions/virgin_islands_law_component [https://perma.cc/JM9P-7SUS] 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
179. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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take the state’s bar examination.180 There are generally three types of
admission without examination:181 (1) pure-years-of-practice admission;
(2) UBE or MPRE related admissions; and (3) limited-state-to-state
reciprocity.
In the first group are states that permit attorneys from any other state
to be admitted if they have practiced for a certain number of years and are
in good standing in the states of their licensure. This is the case in North 
Dakota.182 In the second group are states that permit reciprocity and
require not only a minimum number of years in the active practice of law,
but also passage of the UBE and the MPRE, the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination, or just the MPRE.183 
In the third group, the limited-state-to-state-reciprocity route, are
states that automatically allow an attorney licensed in one or more specific
other states to get licensed in another state simply by application and proof
of character and fitness, as long as the original licensing state permits
attorneys from the admitting state the same rights. These states impose a
minimum years of practice requirement before admission without
examination can be considered, and some of these couple this with a
limited continuing legal education requirement. The reciprocity can be
broad, as is the case for those states that permit admission without
examination from any state with similar reciprocity, or it can be more
narrowly focused with special rules of automatic reciprocity for certain
states.
180. See Reciprocity: What States Can You Practice Law?, ON BALANCE
SEARCH CONSULTANTS, (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.onbalancesearch.com/
blog-page/reciprocity-what-states-can-you-practice-law/ [https://perma.cc/FXD4
-FB7P].
181. See barreciprocity.com, which seeks to assemble the reciprocity rules of
every state.
182. See, for example, Rule 7. Admission by Motion, STATE OF NORTH 
DAKOTA COURTS, https://www.ndcourts.gov/legal-resources/rules/admissionto
practicer/7 [https://perma.cc/896M-TDQJ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020), which
requires only five years of practice, plus proof of good standing and affidavits
showing “the applicant’s good moral character and fitness to practice law.” While 
North Dakota requires continuing legal education, none of those CLE
requirements need be on the laws of the State of North Dakota.
183. For example, to be admitted to practice law in Texas without an
examination, you must be licensed in another state, have scored 85 or higher on
the MPRE, and have been engaged in the active practice of law “for at least 5 of
the 7 years immediately preceding your application.” See Admission without 
Examination Information, TEXAS BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, https://ble
.texas.gov/admission-without-examination [https://perma.cc/V9FS-TW43] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2020).
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744 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
An example of broad reciprocity is Missouri, which permits admission
without examination for any attorney licensed in a state that would do the
same for Missouri attorneys.184 On the other hand, a Louisiana lawyer who 
seeks admission by motion in Missouri cannot succeed because Louisiana 
does not recognize reciprocity with Missouri.185 
An example of a narrower, semi-automatic form of reciprocity can be
found among the states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. An
attorney in Maine can be admitted on application in New Hampshire and
Vermont, and vice-versa. While this three-state reciprocity requires a
limited CLE session on the admitting state’s “practice and procedure,”
there are no requirements that the CLE include any specific substantive 
area of the law.186 
184. Missouri Board of Law Examiners Rule 8.10 permits admission without
examination only if the lawyer is licensed in a “jurisdiction that permits mutuality
of admission without examination to Missouri lawyers.” See Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar in Missouri – 8.01 The Board of Law Examiners, MISSOURI 
BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, https://www.mble.org/rule-8 [https://perma.cc
/86PG-BPWF] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
185. Louisiana does not recognize reciprocal admissions. See Rule XVII(11)
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which states: “No person shall be admitted to
the Bar of this state based solely upon the fact that such person is admitted to the 
Bar of another state or because the laws of another state would grant admission to
a member of the Bar of this state . . . .” Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/RuleXVII.asp
[https://perma.cc/E9RW-CGS4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
186. See MAINE BAR ADMISSION RULE IV(11A)(a)(2)(A)–(B) (June 24,
2014), http://www.mainebarexaminers.org/pages/PDF/0914%20Bar%20Admiss
ion%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9W7-W94P], which allows for reciprocal
admission upon proof of character and fitness if the applicant:
2. (A) Has been an active member in good standing of the bar of the State 
of New Hampshire and has been primarily engaged in the active practice
of law in the State of New Hampshire for no less than three years
immediately preceding the date upon which the application is filed;
(B) Has been an active member in good standing of the bar of the State 
of Vermont and has been primarily engaged in the active practice of law 
in the State of Vermont for no less than three years immediately
preceding the date upon which the application is filed; . . . .
See also N.H. SUP. CT. R. 42(b)&(c), which provide:
(b) Vermont Applicant. An applicant who is licensed to practice law in
Vermont may, upon motion, be admitted to the bar without examination,
provided that the State of Vermont allows admission without
examination of persons admitted to practice law in New Hampshire
under circumstances comparable to those set forth in this rule. Such an
applicant shall meet the Eligibility Requirements set forth in Rule
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42(IV)(a), (V)(a), and (VI), and the following additional requirements.
The applicant shall:
(1) be licensed to practice law in the State of Vermont and be an
active member of the Vermont bar; and
(2) have been primarily engaged in the active practice of law in
Vermont for no less than three years immediately preceding the date
upon which the motion is filed; and
(3) establish that the applicant is currently a member in good
standing in all jurisdictions where admitted; and
(4) establish that the applicant is not currently subject to lawyer
discipline or the subject of a pending disciplinary matter in any
jurisdiction; and
(5) have completed at least 900 minutes of continuing legal 
education on New Hampshire practice and procedure within one 
year immediately preceding the date upon which the motion is filed
and be certified by the NHMCLE Board as satisfying this
requirement; and
(6) designate the clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court as
agent for service of process; and
(7) file with the board the required motion form, a completed
petition and questionnaire for admission, and supporting documents,
accompanied by the motion fee.
(c) Maine Applicant. An applicant who is licensed to practice law in
Maine may, upon motion, be admitted to the bar without examination,
provided that the State of Maine allows admission without examination
of persons admitted to practice law in New Hampshire under
circumstances comparable to those set forth in this rule. Such an
applicant shall meet the Eligibility Requirements set forth in Rule
42(IV)(a), (V), and (VI), and the following additional requirements. The 
applicant shall:
(1) be licensed to practice law in the State of Maine and be an active 
member of the Maine bar;
(2) have been primarily engaged in the active practice of law in
Maine for no less than three years immediately preceding the date
upon which the motion is filed;
(3) establish that the applicant is currently a member in good
standing in all jurisdictions where admitted;
(4) establish that the applicant is not currently subject to lawyer
discipline or the subject of a pending disciplinary matter in any
jurisdiction;
(5) have completed at least 900 minutes of continuing legal 
education on New Hampshire practice and procedure within one 
year immediately preceding the date upon which the motion is filed
and be certified by the NHMCLE Board as satisfying this
requirement; and
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746 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Regardless of the form of admission without examination, however,
none of the states permitting such admissions require any kind of proof
that the lawyer seeking to be licensed have any knowledge of the laws of
the admitting state. Therefore, when one looks at these rules, it seems
apparent that an implicit assumption behind them is that, if a lawyer has
practiced for a certain number of years, the attorney has gained enough
knowledge and competency to effectively represent clients in the
admitting state, even if the attorney has never specifically studied the laws
of that state. These admission-without-examination rules undermine any
argument that the multijurisdictional-practice limitations have anything to
do with providing local clients with lawyers with proven knowledge of
local laws. 
C. States Do Not Require That Continuing Legal Education Courses
Include “Local” Law
For those states that mandate lawyers take continuing legal education
courses to keep their licenses current, there is no requirement that the 
courses include ones focused on the specific laws of the state,187 although 
many states specify that time be spent in courses on topics such as ethics,
professionalism, substance abuse, or mental illness awareness.188 
(6) designate the clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court as
agent for service of process; and
(7) file with the board the required motion form, a completed
petition and questionnaire for admission, and supporting documents,
accompanied by the motion fee.
See also Admission to the Vermont Bar, VERMONT JUDICIARY, https://www
.vermontjudiciary.org/attorneys/admission-vermont-bar [https://perma.cc/7H6A-
MYMA] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). The court’s website states admission is
permitted if applicants “have been admitted in New Hampshire and Maine, been
actively engaged in the practice of law for no less than three years immediately
preceding the filing of the application); and . . . [not] scored lower than 270 on the
UBE within the five years immediately preceding the filing of the application.”
187. This statement is in reference to continuing legal education requirements
that apply to all lawyers licensed in that state. It is not intended to deal with the
rules of state-authorized specialization certification. The ABA maintains a web
page with links to all state CLE rules. See Mandatory CLE, ABA, https://
www.americanbar.org/events-cle/mcle/ [https://perma.cc/XTJ3-DUQP] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2020).
188. Examples of state CLE requirements include the description found on
Florida Bar’s CLE webpage, which outlines the requirements of its Rule 6-
10.3(B):
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The fact that an attorney is not required to take continuing education
courses in “local law” to maintain a license to practice in the state, even
for “local lawyers” who have been in practice for decades and whose
knowledge of changes in local laws in areas in which they do not regularly 
Effective March 5, 2019, 5 of the required 33 credit hours must be in
approved legal ethics, professionalism, bias elimination, substance
abuse, or mental illness awareness programs, with at least 1 of the 5 
hours in an approved professionalism program.
See https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2021/02/Ch-6-2021_06-DEC-RR 
TFB-12-4-2020-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T37G-533N} (last visited 02/28/21).
Here is California’s description of its CLE requirements: 
• Half of the 25 MCLE hours must be in activities approved for
what are called “participatory” MCLE credit.
• No more than 12.5 hours can be for self-study
• Other special requirements:
o At least four hours of legal ethics
o At least one hour on competence issues
o At least one hour in an area called the Recognition and
Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession and
Society
MCLE Requirements, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.cal 
bar.ca.gov/Attorneys/MCLE-CLE/Requirements [https://perma.cc/4XM2-S8Z6] 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2019). New York’s lists the categories of courses acceptable
for CLE credit as: “ethics and professionalism,” “skills,” “law practice
management,” “areas of professional practice,” and “diversity, inclusion and
elimination of bias.” See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, CATEGORIES OF
CLE CREDIT AS DEFINED IN THE PROGRAM RULES 22 NYCRR 1500.2(C)-(G), 
available at https://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-
03/CategoriesofCredit.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4XA-LKD3] (last visited Oct. 5,
2019).
The Illinois MCLE Board describes its requirements as: 
Beginning with the July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2019, and July 1, 2018
through June 30, 2020, two-year reporting periods, attorneys must 
continue to complete 30 total hours of credit, including at least six hours
of professional responsibility (“PR”) credit. However, of those six hours
of PR credit, Illinois attorneys must complete one hour of
diversity/inclusion PR credit and one hour of mental health/substance
abuse PR credit. Please refer to the Commission on Professionalism’s
FAQs for additional information. Note, attorneys can fulfill their entire
PR requirement, including the diversity/inclusion and mental
health/substance abuse requirement, by completing the year-long 
Lawyer-to-Lawyer Mentoring Program.
Illinois MCLE Requirements and Fees, MCLE, https://www.mcleboard
.org/files/AttorneyMCLERequirement.aspx?MenuType=Attorney&subMenuTy 
pe=mclerequirement [https://perma.cc/A75C-BXMJ] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
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748 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
practice may be weak or nonexistent, belies the argument that “local law,”
with its constant statutory and jurisprudential changes, is so unique that no
out-of-state lawyer can either master it or advise “local” clients about it.
IX. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH MODEL RULE 5.5’S 
ISSUES
The problems with current Model Rule 5.5 are shown not only by the fact
that a majority of states have not adopted the rule verbatim, but also by the
multitude of alternatives that have been advanced. Suggestions from
commentators, ABA working groups, and others range from permitting a
lawyer licensed in one state to practice law in another without being a
resident,189 having to pass the bar,190 or being formally admitted to
practice. These proposals have included:
• A system of national registration for attorneys;
• A local registration requirement;
• A “driver’s license” approach; and
• Altering the definition of a lawyer’s “practice.”
Each suggestion has attributes and detriments and will be discussed.
The place to begin, however, is to look at what other countries are doing
and what a working group of an ABA Commission has recommended.
A. What Other Countries Are Doing and What an ABA Working Group 
Recommended
The ABA created the Commission on Ethics 20/20 in August 2009 to 
examine the effect of technology and globalization on the legal
profession.191 The Commission met regularly as a whole and also formed
several working groups which were chaired by Commission members and
189. Colorado, for example, permits out-of-state attorneys who move to
Colorado to obtain a limited admission to practice—limited to “acting as counsel 
for such single client (which may include a business entity or an organization and
its organizational affiliates).” See COLO. R. CIV. P. 204.1.
190. There have been proposals for a national license-via-admission-to-
practice-by-motion. These proposals essentially would allow a lawyer to be
formally admitted to the bar of any state upon motion. See, for example, the
proposal contained in Perlman, supra note 101.
191. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA, https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/aba-commissi 
on-on--ethics-20-20/ [https://perma.cc/FF7R-7SR2] (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
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included representatives from other ABA constituencies.192 The
Commission released initial proposals concerning inbound foreign lawyer
issues,193 confidentiality-related ethics issues arising from lawyers’ use of
technology,194 issues related to the outsourcing of legal work,195 choice of
law in cross-border practice,196 multijurisdictional practice issues,197 
nonlawyer ownership of interests in law firms,198 and alternative methods
for litigation financing.199 
192. Id. 
193. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, MEMORANDA AND TEMPLATES




194. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER FOR COMMENT— 
CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND LAWYERS’ USE OF TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 20, 2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_resp 
onsibility/2011build/ethics2020/clientconfidentiality_issuespaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YBE-D367]; see also ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES
PAPER FOR COMMENT—LAWYERS’ USE OF INTERNET BASED CLIENT 




195. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, DISCUSSION DRAFT REGARDING




196. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER: CHOICE OF LAW 
IN CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2011build/20111801 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GX4-2MHB].
197. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER
CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/mjp_issues_paper 
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHG9-L83Z].
198. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER
CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES (Apr. 5, 2011), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/abs_issues_ 
paper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/42RU-4UEL].
199. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white 
_paper_final_hod_informational_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYC8-USME]
(discussing lawyer involvement in alternative litigation financing).
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750 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The Commission considered several proposed modifications to the
Model Rules concerning the unauthorized practice of law and the
multijurisdictional practice of law.200 The Working Group on Uniformity, 
Choice of Law, and Conflicts of Interest issued a paper focused on Model
Rule 5.5 201 which contains a discussion both of how other countries deal
with the multijurisdictional practice issue and what has been called the
“driver’s license” approach. 
The Working Group’s Issue Paper formally endorsed a change
permitting an out-of-state U.S. lawyer to begin practicing in a state
immediately if the lawyer “submits an application for admission by
motion, by examination, or as a foreign legal consultant within [60] days
of first providing legal services in this jurisdiction,” as long as the lawyer
fulfills the admission requirements at the time of application and the
lawyer previously has not been denied admission in the state because of
character and fitness issues.202 Apparently, the Working Group did not
view this proposal as controversial, citing to the fact that the District of
Columbia, which has a similar rule, “has not reported any problems arising
out of the existence of th[e] Rule.”203 The Working Group’s proposal
became Resolution 105D for the House of Delegates meeting at the ABA
Annual Meeting in August 2012, and was adopted by the House of
Delegates.204 
What would have had a greater impact upon transactional attorneys,
but not telecommuters, however, were some of the alternative approaches
that were discussed but not formally endorsed in the Issue Paper: the
Colorado Approach; Canada’s interprovincial compact model; the
200. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
201. See FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE, supra note 197 (discussing issues paper concerning multijurisdictional
practice).
202. Id. at 2; see also ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL
RESOLUTION MODEL RULE 5.5 (D)(3)/CONTINUOUS AND SYSTEMATIC PRESENCE




203. FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 5 (discussing issues paper concerning
multijurisdictional practice). Consider this rationale in light of the fact that
Colorado “has not reported any problems arising out of the existence” of its rule.
204. See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2013, supra note 27.
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7512021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
European Union’s system of mutual recognition; and the Australian
model.205 
The Issue Paper noted that Colorado allows an out-of-state lawyer “to
practice freely in Colorado on a temporary basis (subject only to pro hac
vice requirements) as long as the lawyer does not take up residence in
Colorado or establish an office there.”206 The paper went on to describe
“Canada’s Interprovincial Compact Model” as creating “avenues for
lawyers to work permanently in all provinces and territories without the
need for further bar examination, and temporarily in all provinces,”207 
including, to a more limited degree, even in civil law, French-language
Quebec, “federal law, the law of their home jurisdiction, and public
international law,”208 which takes it beyond the Colorado Approach.
The European Union’s approach is even broader than Canada’s.209 As
described in the Issue Paper, the E.U. allows, “European lawyers from one
E.U. country (home jurisdiction) to establish themselves permanently in
another E.U. country (host jurisdiction) and practice law there.”210 This 
“Directive”211 “applies to E.U. countries whose admission requirements
range from very stringent to lenient, and it applies to both civil law and
common law jurisdictions.”212 While the Issues Paper did not address the
fact that E.U. countries have several distinctly different languages,213 it 
went on to state that while there are “some practice limitations with respect
to certain kinds of court and uniquely ‘local’ work, the lawyer is otherwise
permitted to practice law in the host jurisdiction under his or her home
title.”214 Yet, the E.U. Directive is tempered by a the mandate that, to gain
205. See FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 5–9 (discussing issues paper concerning
multijurisdictional practice).
206. Id. at 5.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. at 7.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 8.
211. Id. at 7.
212. Id. at 8.
213. See Claire Weber, Hungarian and Finnish: Both Languages Evolved
from a Common Language, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 31, 2019), http://www.thought
co.com/hungarian-and-finnish-1434479 [https://perma.cc/74X7-DFY3]. There is
supposed to be a connection between Finnish and Hungarian. However, that does
not do English, French, German or Spanish speakers a lot of good. For that matter,
just navigating those four related languages is far beyond what reasonably might
be expected of most E.U. lawyers. See id.
214. FOR COMMENT: ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE, supra note 197, at 8. 
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752 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the ability to use the host jurisdiction’s professional titles, the Directive
requires the lawyer to practice the host jurisdiction’s law “‘effectively and
regularly’ for three years . . . . At that point the lawyer is officially licensed
in the host jurisdiction.”215 
The Issues Paper also describes “The Australian Model,”216 which
allows more multijurisdictional practice than does the United States, but
is not as accommodating as Canada or the E.U.217 In 2004 the Australian
National Legal Profession Model Bill was published which “provided the 
states and territories with a template to draft legislation that would permit
seamless practice by a lawyer from one jurisdiction to another.”218 This
has become the model for legislation by some Australian states and
territories. It requires a lawyer to be admitted in at least one jurisdiction
and allows the lawyer to practice in another jurisdiction and, if notice is
given to that jurisdiction, to open an office in that jurisdiction.219 
The Issues Paper concluded its description of alternative approaches
to multijurisdictional practice with the following bullet point questions:
• What advantages or disadvantages would such approaches
have relative to the current regulation of cross-border practice
in Model Rule 5.5 and admission by motion procedures? For
example, would new difficulties or challenges arise for
disciplinary authorities with regard to continuing legal
education requirements or trust account rules if any of the
above alternatives were adopted?
• Should the Commission consider proposing a system similar
to Colorado’s? 
• Should the Commission develop a white paper that explores
in detail whether the development of interstate compacts
similar to those in Canada or forms of mutual recognition as
215. Id.
216. Id. 
217. In 1992, the Commonwealth of Australia “passed a Mutual Recognition
Act that enabled a lawyer registered in one jurisdiction to practice in another,”
which was adopted by all Australian states and territories, and which required “the
lawyer to register in the host state or territory and obtain a local practicing
certificate.” See id. at 8–9. Several Australian states and territories then adopted
the 1998 Interstate Practice Certificate System which “was created to enable a
lawyer from one Australian state/territory to practice in another without having to
be admitted in the second state/territory.” Id. at 9.
218. Id. 
219. See id.
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in Europe and Australia would be feasible alternatives or
supplements to Model Rule 5.5?220 
These questions indicate that significant changes to Model Rule 5.5
should be considered. The Working Group’s report noted that the
multijurisdictional practice rules needed clarification or changes,221 but no 
220. See id.
221. The statement read:
The Commission considered other possible amendments to Model Rule 
5.5 that would have resulted in more significant changes. For example,
the Commission seriously considered whether to propose a restructured
version of Model Rule 5.5 that would have resembled Colorado’s Rule 
220. That Rule permits a lawyer who is licensed in another U.S.
jurisdiction to practice freely in Colorado on a temporary basis (subject
only to pro hac vice requirements) as long as the lawyer does not take up
residence in Colorado or establish an office there. Although the Colorado
approach has many advantages, the Commission ultimately concluded
that the practice authority afforded by the Colorado approach is
substantially similar to the practice authority that already exists under
Model Rule 5.5. The Commission had difficulty identifying common
scenarios in which a lawyer would be permitted to practice in Colorado
on a temporary basis, but clearly precluded from doing so in a
jurisdiction that had adopted Model Rule 5.5.
To the extent that the Colorado Rule offers more practice authority than
the Model Rule, the Commission thought that the difference might relate
to Model Rule 5.5(c)(4). That paragraph permits lawyers to practice on
a temporary basis in a jurisdiction if the matter arises out of or is
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is admitted to practice. Comment [14] elaborates on the meaning
of this paragraph, and the Commission considered the possibility of
adding clarifying language to that Comment to make clear that Model
Rule 5.5(c)(4) should be interpreted liberally. The Commission
determined, however, that additional guidance on the scope of Model
Rule 5.5(c)(4) would be more appropriate in the form of an opinion from
the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Commission has referred that issue to the Standing
Committee for its consideration. [emphasis added].
ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR
COMMENT—NEW ABA MODEL RULE ON PRACTICE PENDING ADMISSION 
(FORMERLY PROPOSED MODEL RULE 5.5(D)(3)) AND AMENDMENTS TO ABA
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754 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
further action has been taken by the ABA at the time this Article was
written. 
The Ethics 20/20 Commission accepted the Working Group’s ultimate 
recommendation that extended the right of an out-of-state lawyer admitted
in at least one state to practice in a state in which she was not admitted, the
Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission.222 This is a stand-alone rule
permitting an out-of-state lawyer to practice in association with a lawyer
admitted in the state in which the lawyer is diligently seeking to be 
admitted by motion or by examination.223 
B. The National Registration Approach
Some commentators have suggested a “truly national bar”224 that
would eliminate all state barriers. Those who have proposed this issue
posit the creation of a federal statute enacted under the constitutional
authority to regulate interstate commerce. They point to the regulation of
attorneys in Australia and Canada as examples to be emulated.225 They
also suggest what specific provisions such a statute might include.226 This 
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See Marvin Comisky & Philip C. Patterson, The Case for a Federally
Created National Bar by Rule or by Legislation, 55 TEMP. L. Q. 945 (1982); see 
also Wolfram, supra note 83, at 704; Gerard J. Clark, The Two Faces of Multi-
Jurisdictional Practice, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 251 (2002).
225. See Jones et al., supra note 145.
226. See id. at 189–90.
Specifically, we propose that Congress should adopt a narrowly drawn
statute that mandates mutual recognition of rights of practice by lawyers
across state borders as described below:
(1) Acting under its constitutional authority to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce and its general legislative powers, the Congress
should mandate that:
• In all matters pending before the courts of the United States; 
• In all matters involving federal law; 
• In all matters involving international treaties; 
• In all matters involving tribal law; and
• In all matters affecting interstate or foreign commerce; 
any person licensed to practice law and in good standing in any United
States jurisdiction will be deemed qualified to practice law in every other
United States jurisdiction (whether or not specifically licensed there),
subject only to the restrictions set out below.
(2) Any person who holds himself or herself out to the public as regularly
practicing or as a practitioner licensed in a jurisdiction in which the
practitioner is not licensed must comply with the qualification
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proposal corresponds to assertions that it is unconstitutional to require out-
of-state lawyers to take local bar exams in order to be admitted to practice
in another state.227 
Regardless of whether a “national registration” approach is proposed
to be created via statute or some type of bar-related entity, it appears that
this proposal will not gain traction in the current political environment. It
can be anticipated that local and national bar associations will oppose
federalizing the definition and licensing of the practice of law. When a
similar suggestion was raised more than 40 years ago, commentators were
critical of it, and it is anticipated that those same criticisms will be raised
today,228 for commentators have asserted that having what amounts to a 
mandatory national bar “threatens the independence of the legal profession
and should be rejected on this basis alone. State-based regulation preserves
liberty.”229 
requirements of that jurisdiction, regardless of the broad practice rights
described in paragraph (1) above.
(3) Any person who, pursuant to the practice rights described in
paragraph (1) above, practices law in a jurisdiction in which he or she is
not otherwise admitted to practice shall be subject to the disciplinary
rules of such jurisdiction with respect to his or her activities in such
jurisdiction, provided that the requirements imposed under such rules are
no more onerous than requirements imposed on persons who are licensed
to practice in such jurisdiction.
227. See Perlman, supra note 101.
228. See Wolfram, supra note 83, at 704. (“Again, when one presses the
details, or perhaps sooner, the reasons why the idea is poor, if not absurd, are
readily apparent. Most obviously, the current political environment is not
conducive to such an idea. The same Congress that has set its sights on uprooting
existing federal bureaucracies, in some instances wholesale, would hardly be
interested in creating a new one. Beyond the pragmatic, the constitutional basis of
the power of Congress to enact such a sweeping scheme is problematic. Perhaps
of greatest importance, powerful lessons from history should give pause to anyone
who might be tempted to think that a federal agency with plenary power to
regulate lawyers would solve more problems than it would create.”).
229. Daly, supra note 99, at 784 (“Adjustments in power are what the legal
profession is all about. The creation of a national bar would, of necessity, be a
political act. It would require legislation and an administrative scheme. No matter
how carefully the legislation was crafted, it would inevitably place lawyers under
the thumb of Congress and an administrative bureaucracy. This new regime would
curtail the role of lawyers as power adjusters, lessening the protection of
individual liberty.”).
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756 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
C. A Local Registration Requirement
A local registration rule would allow an attorney licensed in one state
to give a notice to the appropriate regulatory agency when undertaking any
non-tribunal work in a state in which the attorney is not licensed.
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether this notice would have to be
given before any work was performed, during the time the work is being
performed, or within a certain period of time after the work was
completed, or, as an additional consideration, whether registration would
not be required for one-time activities but would be required for multiple
activities. 
Litigation attorneys always have enjoyed a quasi-registration rule with
the ability to obtain pro hac vice admission, although some states prohibit
out-of-state litigators from pro hac vice admission if they, or others in their
firm, have filed such motions more than X times; once the numerical goal
line has been crossed, the lawyer must file a motion for in-state bar
admission before filing any further papers in any state court in that
jurisdiction.230 
Depending on how it is drafted, a “local registration” rule might
supersede and make meaningless the provisions in Model Rule 5.5(c) on
temporary practice. Some have suggested a way to keep the “temporary
basis” requirement is through a variation of a local registration rule— 
transactional lawyers would be allowed to do “one time” deals in the state
if they registered for each deal. The problem here is that this type of
registration potentially discloses client confidences; not only would the
identity of the client have to be disclosed,231 but it is possible the attorney 
230. See, e.g., MISS. R. APP. P. r. 46. It states in part:
ii. “General Practice” . . . [a]ppearances by a foreign attorney before the 
courts or administrative agencies of this state in more than five (5)
separate unrelated causes or other matter within the twelve (12) months
immediately preceding the appearance in question shall be deemed the
general practice of law in this state, which may be performed only by an
attorney properly admitted and in good standing as a member of the 
Mississippi Bar. Appearance of a foreign attorney shall commence with
the first appearance and continue until final determination on the merits 
or until the foreign attorney has obtained an order permitting him to
withdraw.
See id. r. 46(8)(ii); see also discussion supra note 2.
231. It should be noted that this approach is different than that adopted in
Colorado. The Colorado rule applies only to lawyers who move to the state, not 
lawyers who are working temporarily there. Likewise, the Colorado rule applies
only to single client, not to “deals.” This is vastly different from a rule that would
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7572021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
might be required to describe sufficient details for the regulator to see that
this was a one-time deal.232 And if the attorney would not have to disclose
the particulars of a deal, how would a regulator know it was a single
transaction and not another way around the purported “temporary” 
practice of law in the state?
There are some additional issues with a “local registration”
requirement. Notice to regulators, if it were free, would seem to be
unnecessary, as Model Rule 8.5 already subjects lawyers to discipline in
any jurisdiction where they are found to be practicing law. States might
charge a fee if registration were required.233 If states use local registration
as a fundraising mechanism, the costs to attorneys to register in more than
one state could be huge.
While one might see this as a windfall for some state regulators, many 
states could be overwhelmed with registrations. For example, more than
two decades ago, in writing about such a proposal, Professor Wolfram, the
Reporter for the Restatement, estimated that, in some states like Delaware,
New York, and California, “the number of lawyers registering might
approach half a million.”234 Today, those numbers might be enormous, and
force out-of-state lawyers who have no intention of being state residents to
disclose both client identity and the transactions involved.
232. See, e.g., Needham, supra note 5, at 130–31 (“A potentially more
intractable difficulty is that limiting the admission only for legal work done for a
specific matter would create implementation problems for the frequent situation
in which seeking the advice is interpreted as a signal of future behavior. Clients
do not want to go on record any earlier than necessary when they are considering
restructuring their debt, or negotiating for something which their competitors also
want to obtain--such as rights to wheel electricity across power lines. If the state’s
registry required that an out-of-state attorney specify the client which he would
be advising, the fact that the representation was now a matter of public record
would inhibit the client’s willingness to seek the advice of an out-of-state attorney.
For example, if an attorney who is a nationally known expert in bankruptcy law
is required to list the name of the client whom he would be advising, a company
which had been rumored to be having financial difficulties but which had not yet 
made those difficulties public would be reluctant to hire that attorney. Even the
simple fact that the company had retained that bankruptcy expert could affect the
company’s relationships with creditors, employees and potential business
partners.”).
233. For example, in a litigation context, Texas currently charges $250 for
each non-resident pro hac vice motion. See Non-Resident Attorney Fee (Pro Hac
Vice), TEX. BD. OF L. EXAM’RS, https://ble.texas.gov/non-resident-attorney-fee-
info [https://perma.cc/LJ6S-3UZ2] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
234. See Wolfram, supra note 83, at 702.
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758 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the bureaucracy such registrations might create might be large, even if
states adopted online, electronic registrations.
In addition, if a fee is imposed for registration, this may give
advantages to large firms to the detriment of those in smaller firms or in
solo practices, because large firms with appropriate financial resources
might simply register every one of their lawyers in every state. While this
multiple-state registration may not be a problem per se, it might increase
the disparity between large firms and every other provider of legal
services. 
D. A Redefinition of Unauthorized Practice or a “Driver’s License” 
Approach
The ABA Working Group discussed what some have called the
“driver’s license” model. This would redefine “unauthorized practice” to
exclude work by any lawyer licensed in any other state.235 If an attorney
was licensed in one state and in good standing there, the lawyer could then
practice law in any state. To be truly equivalent to a “driver’s license”
approach, however, it would have to be accompanied with a requirement
that when a lawyer becomes a domiciliary or citizen of a state in which the
lawyer was not licensed, re-licensing must occur in that new state. This
235. See Davis, supra note 149 (“Redefine the term ‘unauthorized practice of
law’ to exclude (i.e. not apply to) the practice of law by any person admitted to
the bar of any state who remains in good standing in her jurisdiction(s) of
admission. This system gets us all directly to the point where ‘if it looks like and
duck, and swims and quacks like a duck, it’s probably at duck,’ (i.e., a lawyer is
a lawyer, whatever state originally admitted her).”); see also Davis, supra note 99 
(“Perhaps the simplest solution to current UPL problems is to redefine UPL. This
solution requires the least effort from the states, while allowing them to maintain
the most control over lawyer regulation. A new definition would differentiate
between persons licensed in other states and those with no legal experience. A
lawyer licensed and in good standing in another jurisdiction would not
automatically be disqualified from practicing within the state. The definition of
unauthorized practice would allow for changes in the nature of legal services, and
lawyers then would be aware of when they could be violating the rules. Amended
rules also would include “safe harbor” provisions. These provisions would
address all areas specific to current multijurisdictional practice, such as separate 
subsections relating to, among others, in-house counsel, prelitigation activities, or
alternative dispute resolution. Some states have recommended a safe harbor type
of reform in addition to registration. For example, California’s task force
recommended that a safe harbor approach apply when an attorney’s involvement
is too brief or infrequent to justify completion of a cumbersome registration
process.”).
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means that even a “driver’s license” approach would have to be combined
with either an admission-without-examination or reciprocity rule.
The Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL)
supports the driver’s license rule236 and has argued in favor its adoption in
proposals or statements to different ABA bodies.237 In its proposal made
in 2001, APRL indicated its preference for universal admission238 but
settled for a definition of the unauthorized practice of law that excludes
the temporary practice of law.239 That proposal also included a “permanent
registration” system for lawyers not admitted in a state “that will permit
lawyers who are duly admitted in a state to establish practices in other
236. The APRL position is supported by another, more discrete body, a group
of Law Firm General Counsel who submitted comments on the UCLCI Issues
Paper before the APRL 2011 Proposal was submitted: “We look forward to the
prospect of supporting APRL in this endeavor when its report is released.” See
ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL 
COUNSEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS
AND SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS (Mar. 2011), https://perma.cc/C9RM-EGAY.
237. See PROPOSAL TO THE ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE (Feb. 2011) (on file with author); see also ASSOCIATION OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, A PROPOSAL FOR FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS AMONG THE STATES (Apr. 4, 2011), http://aprl.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/2011-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/66FX-Q9XA];
ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWYER, STATEMENT ON ABA
ETHICS 20/20 COMMISSION PROPOSED TEMPLATES RE INBOUND FOREIGN
LAWYER ISSUES (Oct. 25, 2011), https://aprl.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
APRL_Statement_Ethics2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5YP-DFEE].




APRL believes that it is of crucial importance for the bar, the states, and
the public that the issue of multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”) be 
addressed and substantive changes made to the way in which lawyers are
regulated when they practice across state borders.
The essence of the APRL proposal is that the states establish a common, 
uniform system permitting the free movement of lawyers, and the free
trade in legal services, across state lines, without derogating from the
states’ legitimate and historic interests in regulating the legal profession.
239. See id. (“The prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law shall not 
apply to an attorney duly licensed and authorized to practice law in another state 
while such attorney is temporarily in this state and is engaged in either (i) a
particular matter, or (ii) particular matters to the extent such matters arise out of
or are otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in such other state.”)
(the “model law” included in “III. The APRL Proposal, 1. Temporary Presence”).
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760 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
states subject to the supervision of the states where they wish to establish
themselves.”240 
The APRL took a further step in a statement released in early 2011,241 
recommending leaving Model Rule 5.5 essentially as is but excluding from
the unauthorized-practice restriction actions by lawyers tied to the number
of days in any calendar year the attorney was in a jurisdiction.242 This
proposal attempted to quantify what current Model Rule 5.5(c) calls
“temporary” practice; however, it implicitly requires detailed records of
time spent in the state, a requirement not present in existing Model Rule
5.5(c). Further, to the extent that the time spent in a state must be tracked,
a record-keeping requirement may require disclosure of client identity or
client activities, which may run afoul of the confidentiality rules.
Later in 2011, APRL issued a “Statement” supporting the work of
another of the Commission’s working groups, noting that, while APRL
“supports all of the current proposals of the Commission, APRL views
those proposals as simply implementing and completing the reforms
adopted in 2002. APRL urges the Commission to consider further
expansion of multijurisdictional practice, both within the United States
and internationally.”243 
240. Id. The beginning of the “second tier” of the “Executive Summary.”
241. See A PROPOSAL FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS AMONG THE
STATES, supra note 237.
242. See id.
https://aprl.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2011-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/972T-
7YCS] (last visited 02/28/21):
(a) Without limiting any authorization to practice law afforded by any
other rule or law applicable in this jurisdiction, including federal law,
including paragraph (b) and (c) below, a lawyer admitted to practice law
and in good standing in another United States jurisdiction may provide
legal services in this jurisdiction for up to [one hundred] days in any
calendar year, unless authorized to do so for a longer period under
paragraphs (b) or (c).
243. See ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS,
STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS
ON ABA ETHICS 20/20 COMMISSION PROPOSALS RE INBOUND FOREIGN LAWYER
ISSUES (Oct. 25, 2011), https://aprl.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/APRL_
Statement_ABARevisionsReInBoundForeignLawyers.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5S
5-64Q6]. 
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7612021] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
E. Changing the Definition of What Type of Work Is Reasonably Related 
to the Lawyer’s Practice
Another approach involves amending Model Rule 5.5 to permit
lawyers, in matters that do not involve courts or tribunals, to practice on a
temporary basis in states where they are not licensed without the
requirement that local counsel be involved on an active participation basis
if the work is not within Model Rule 5.5(a) or (b) but is either (i)
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is admitted to practice; or (ii) reasonably related to the lawyer’s
customary and usual practice of a particular area of law, or a body of
federal, foreign, international, or substantially similar state law.
Requiring that the work be reasonably related to the lawyer’s
customary and usual practice of a particular area of law could greatly
lessen concerns about competency and enhance the ability of clients to use 
counsel who have the ability and capacity to do multistate work without
mandatorily adding the costs and expense of hiring local counsel. Of
course, nothing would preclude the out-of-state lawyer or client from
retaining local counsel, but this proposal would remove the mandate that
they must do so in every instance. 
It can be anticipated that the primary objection to this proposal is that
the phrase “reasonably related to the lawyer’s customary and usual
practice of a particular area of law, or a body of federal, foreign,
international, or substantially similar state law” is either ambiguous or so
broad as to be meaningless. The response to such an argument is that the
phrase is far more precise than the current “reasonably related to the
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice”—a phrase that the current comments to Model Rule 5.5 seem to
tie to both where the lawyer does the work and where the lawyer solicited
the work.244 As has been noted elsewhere in this Article, it seems strange, 
in this day and age, to tie an attorney’s expertise to the state where the
attorney is licensed rather than to an area of law in which the attorney has
focused.
This approach is more expansive than the reference in Model Rule 5.5 
Comment 14 to a “particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign
or international law.”245 It rests on the lawyer’s customary and usual
practice and Comment 14’s reference to “the lawyer’s recognized
expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of
244. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmts. 13, 14 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2002).
245. Id. r. 5.5 cmt. 14.
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762 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
clients,” while recognizing that many areas of law in which attorneys
acquire expertise are not limited to uniform laws or federal laws. For
example, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act has not been adopted in 10
states including New York and Michigan,246 while the Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act, in either its 1995 version247 or its 2006 version,248 
has not been adopted by over 20 states; therefore, in those jurisdictions,
there is no “uniform law” under the current version of Model Rule 5.5 that
would shield an out-of-state attorney seeking to assist a client in a matter
involving a limited partnership or limited liability company in the 
situations posited in Hypotheticals 1 and 2, above. Likewise, more than 30
states have not adopted the Uniform Condominium Act,249 the Uniform
Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act,250 the Uniform Family Law
Arbitration Act,251 the Uniform Guardian and Protective Proceedings
Act,252 the Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act,253 the Uniform
Limited Cooperative Association Act,254 the Uniform Manufactured
246. See PARTNERSHIP ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 1997), http://www.uniform
laws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=52456941-7883-47a5-
91b6-d2f086d0bb44 [https://perma.cc/ X9WL-RUPB].




248. See LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, REVISED (Unif. L. Comm’n
1995), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Community
Key=bbea059c-6853-4f45-b69b-7ca2e49cf740 [https://perma.cc/ZU8A-WVTG].
249. See CONDOMINIUM ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 1997), https://www.uniform
laws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3%20304f481-3a47-
4f52-9b05-73db978e33bc [https://perma.cc/872R-7FJD].
250. See COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE RECEIVERSHIP ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Community
Key=f8e2d89b-f300-40eb-a419-ad41902fcad2 [https://perma.cc/WA63-GRJN].
251. See FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2016),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=d
df1c9b6-65c0-4d55-bfd7-15c2d1e6d4ed [https:// perma.cc/2YLY-NQAB].
252. See GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n
1997), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Community
Key=d716e47d-f50b-4b68-9e25-dd0af47a13b7 [https://perma.cc/YLL5-C5SW].
253. See HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2015),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=7
%20589b516-7055-4ef7-8631-c9f8c525e69f [https://perma.cc/YL96-WHGU].
254. See LIMITED COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2007),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=2
2f0235d-9d23-4fe0-ba9e-10f02ae0bfd0 [https://perma .cc/EK9Q-UW9F].
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Housing Act,255 the Uniform Mediation Act,256 the Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act,257 the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act,258 the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act,259 the Uniform
Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act,260 and the Uniform
Statutory Trust Entity Act.261 
The lack of uniformity of laws in all of these areas demonstrates that
current Model Rule 5.5’s focus on federal laws or uniform state laws is far
too restrictive. A proposed change to the text of Model Rule 5.5 would
remedy that deficiency.
F. A Change Limited to Telecommuting
Another approach focuses on telecommuting. Because ABA Formal
Opinion 495 does not have the force of law and cannot change the black
letter of existing Model Rule 5.5, some have asserted that the language of
5.5 should be altered to change the definition of what constitutes a
“systematic and continuous” presence in the state. It could exclude from
that definition lawyers who live or spend a long period of time in a state
in which they are not licensed as long as: (i) they do not maintain an office
in that jurisdiction, (ii) the lawyer’s work is unrelated to that jurisdiction,
255. See MANUFACTURED HOUSING ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2012), https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=96fefc9f
-115e-46f0-bf6b-af42368799e5 [https:// perma.cc/58SJ-S4SX].
256. See MEDIATION ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2001), http://www.uniform
laws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=45565a5f-0c57-4bba-b
bab-fc7de9a59110 [https://perma.cc/KJ77-CYFN].
257. See NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2002), https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=d873f0fc
-d9eb-41b3-a6d2-e006e07a1f2c [https://perma.cc/296W-JNXX].
258. See POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2013), https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=70faefab
-5c3d-4146-a51b-9b0a5b1f490d [https://perma.cc/DGP7-CJ9U].
259. See PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n
2012), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Community
Key=2e456584-938e-4008-ba0c-bb6a1a544400 [https://perma.cc/4XAQ-DV5Q].




261. See STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT (Unif. L. Comm’n 2009),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=8
277f058-520e-40f2-8413-bf1c7bc4836d [https:// perma.cc/5G62-V5BV]. 
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764 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
and (iii) the lawyer’s presence in that jurisdiction is invisible to the local
legal market and to local clients.262 
This formulation would permit lawyers who are not licensed in a state
to live there permanently, have a second home there, spend a long vacation 
at a resort or hotel, or spend long periods of time in that state while still
being able to do legal work remotely as long as that work did not concern
the state where the lawyer was sitting while doing the work.
The problem with such a formulation is that it would not aid
transactional lawyers who do multistate deals. Additionally, it would
continue the implicit protection of the “local” market from competition by
creating a legal fiction through the alteration of the phrase “systematic and
continuous.” Under such a reformulation, even if a lawyer was physically
present in a state where the lawyer was not licensed and performing legal
work in that state, under this fiction the lawyer’s physical presence would
not be “systematic and continuous.” To go back to the origins of that
phrase, it could hardly be said that a lawyer who spent weeks at a time in
a state would not be subject to its general jurisdiction,263 but somehow the
lawyer would be treated as not subject to the rules of professional conduct 
in that state.
CONCLUSION
Multijurisdictional practice is increasing, not diminishing. It is no
longer appropriate to ignore the fact that clients want their transactional
attorneys to represent them regularly in multistate deals while at the same
time putting attorneys’ licenses at risk if they do not increase their clients’
costs by obtaining local counsel each and every time they fly into or out
of state, meet with new clients outside of the lawyer’s home state, or
document matters that may involve properties, assets, or entities in several
states. 
Likewise, telecommuting continues to increase. Notwithstanding
ABA Formal Opinion 495, black letter rules that restrict remote practice
make it difficult for lawyers to serve their clients while spending time with 
their families.
In order to allow transactional lawyers and telecommuters to best
serve their clients, and to allow their clients to efficiently and freely choose
lawyers the clients believe will best represent them, multijurisdictional
262. Note, however, that like every change with seemingly universal coverage,
not all would be covered: Ohio’s Ms. Jones was working from an Ohio office
while practicing Kentucky law, where she was admitted to practice. See supra text
accompanying notes 153–56.
263. See supra Section II.B.
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practice rules need to change. There really should be only two questions
remaining—when and by how much?
